Doctrine
Why is ideology considered to be a bad thing? Gordon Brown, Tony Blair and others of that wing of the Labour movement have consistently slammed the desire for higher public spending as ideological, as though that was somehow a powerful slur to be cast at adversaries.
If I were to line up a UK-US analogy, being ‘ideological’ in Labour politics seems to be considered the same as being ‘partisan’ outside of election times in the United States.
I have never believed that compromise for its own sake has any value. Undeniably I am partisan. Nor have I ever believed that maintaining a consistent stream of thought, in whatever theories that stream of grounded, is to be derided. I am unquestionably ideological. That is not, however, the same thing as being unquestioningly ideological. Indeed my critical thought processes remind me that those who use that word as a slur are themselves bearers of ideology.
Whereas on the one hand, it may be ideological to want higher public involvement in the provision of services, it is also ideological to want higher private sector involvement. Both sides contest the question of which is more efficient, but that in itself is ideological. It presupposes that efficiency should be the superior determining factor in deciding the manner in which public services are provided for by the government.
So, despite their rather inaccurate rhetoric, this cannot be what the ‘New’ Labourites mean when they attack other viewpoints as ideological.
More probably what they mean is, the position of demanding higher public spending, of pursuing the supply of public services through state managed ventures, is dogmatic, it is doctrinaire. What the accusation really boils down to is that it is unquestioningly ideological. Without consciously analysing its own preconceptions, it prescribes policy alternatives to the current status quo of PFI, PPP and marketisation. At least, so the Blairites would have us believe.
Among those so designated as unquestioningly ideological, we Marxists are often regarded as the worst of the bunch. Needlessly so, I think, though it is easy to see why people might disagree. The comparisons between Marxists and followers of various religions have been well made in the past; obsessives following the writings of a string of dead men and living very much for a world that can never be realised. At least that is how it may appear on the surface.
At first glance, even the theories of Marx himself can be compared with those of some renowned Christian philosophers, particularly Spinoza. Each had a theory involving the determination of human history, present and future by some force other than conscious decision. Each seemed to view humanity sub specie aeternitatis, i.e., from the aspect of eternity. Just as Spinoza turned the equality of the past and future into a fetish, so the followers of Marx seem ever to urge us to look to some time gone past.
If Marxists only ever sought to engage with serious students of politics and philosophy then such considerations could be dismissed out of hand, but that is not our chosen lot. Far from merely dismissing the invoked parallels between the Marxist trying to sell his paper and the Christian trying to peddle their leaflets on unsuspecting passersby, we should be prepared to argue for the eternally questioning, rational, anti-doctrinaire nature of Marxism.
Additionally, we should resist all those in our movement who would like to relegate Marx, Lenin and the rest to mere repositories of moral authority, like Jesus is to the Christians.
This is a struggle which has enduring relevance for our movement today, particularly if we actually examine the history of the socialist movement. Some see us as consistently urging a return to long dead authors, or casting up the examples of our history in order to establish or re-establish paradigms in which to operate; we should retort that such a stance is not just unquestioningly ideological but unwittingly so.
Unlike religions, far from seeking an ahistorical, messianic imperative from history, we can engage with the concrete, historical thoughts and arguments of our predecessors and pass judgment on them ourselves, rather than accepting them as spirit-breathed.
I shall permit myself one argument from history to give an example. In 1903, a conference was held in Brussels between the leaders of the tiny proletarian movement inside Russia. It included all the faces that would later play huge roles during the 1917 Revolution, both Menshevik and Bolshevik. One of the issues that came to the fore was what the duties of membership should be, and what relationship the membership should have to the leadership.
As anyone involved in revolutionary circles to any degree will know, that is an argument which has not been put to bed. Even inside the movement, there are many who view the established leadership of groups such as the Socialist Party and Socialist Workers Party as entrenched bureaucratic elites-in-waiting. Within the Labour Party, who should be allowed to vote for what is a contentious issue; should it be one-member-one-vote? Should only the activists have a say? Should a Party member be anyone who pays dues?
Anyway, prior to 1903 a young writer and revolutionary named Leon Trotsky argued for rules to govern the RSDLP that would express “the leadership’s organised distrust of the membership.” This was an idea which Trotsky had advanced since 1901, as had Vladimir Lenin. Yet a week or so after taking the stage in defence of such a principle, Trotsky argued against it bitterly and castigated its prime proponent, Lenin. How does one explain the difference?
Thankfully, as Marxists do not raise the political opinions of their esteemed political precursors to the level of gospel, the contradiction is readily historicised and explained.
Julius Martov, leader of the Mensheviks, opponent of Lenin’s narrow definition of what should constitute a Party member, wrote later in his history of the RSDLP that what Lenin proposed was unremarkable. What Trotsky and Lenin had actually wanted was the ‘received wisdom’ of years of working under the harsh Tsarist regime which saw Trotsky spend thirteen years labouring in Siberia, not to mention the many others who joined him.
Trotsky’s change of heart was related to Lenin’s proposal that some members of the editorial board of the Party’s newspaper be unceremoniously dumped. The disagreement was not political, for Lenin proposed himself and two political opponents to lead an editorial board narrowed from six to three. Yet in combination with his membership proposals, it was all too easy to see Lenin as seeking complete dominion over the Party. His iron and unflinching character made such a judgment almost inevitable.
An unthinking doctrinaire would have simple recourse to Lenin’s stance, or to Trotsky’s later stance. Potentially, each has its disadvantages. The pointlessness of excessively broad movements doesn’t require belabouring to those who have witnessed the spectacular failure of our contemporary anti-war movement. Nor do the problems of Lenin’s narrow strategy need recounting to anyone who remembers what the response of the Bolshevik elite to the April Theses was.
I will not elaborate upon my own answer, but the point is that were Marxists merely interested in using past figures as justification for the positions of the present, then we would be just like those for whom Biblical exegesis is an authority higher than human reason. We are not interested in that. There remains only to remind ourselves that accusations of dogmatism, of being ‘ideological,’ are advanced for a purpose which is itself ideological.
The intent is to discredit with popular prejudice the views of a minority who intelligently debate their own views not merely with the people who live and breathe around them, but with all the philosophers of the last two and half millennia.
We should look a little harder and see who the real purveyors of doctrine are, and they are more dangerous than any Marxist, however unthinking. Some of this doctrine is supremely evident in Blairite cheerleader Mike Ion’s defence of Tony’s new ‘faith foundation.‘ Underpinning all of it is a view that religious faith plays a progressive role in politics, and that we who espouse democracy need to be reconciled with it.
How often have we heard the ‘common sense’ argument that it is not religion but the religious who expropriate the name of their religion for nefarious ends?
Ironically this piece of sophistry is often followed by declarations of all the good things that religious people have done, as though expropriation of religion for an objectionable purpose is not the ‘true’ face of the religion, but expropriation of religion for a progressive purpose is that true face.
This is what we are left with by Mike Ion, Tony Blair and all the others who advance upon us using what appears to be reasonable language and common sense. It is this unquestioning ideology, which exists in many of the implicit understanding we have of our society, which be challenged most radically. Otherwise, under the banner of progressivism and tolerance, the intolerant get a free pass to continue holding their bigoted, rationally unjustifiable views.
Mike might, of course, disagree with my seeming caricature of his arguments. Yet he recounts Obama’s conversation with a religious pro-lifer who objected to Obama’s generalisation of pro-lifers as ‘right-wing ideologues.’ Ion’s summative judgment is that we should be having a more reasoned conversation with such people, even though they ‘may not change their position,’ but this misses the point entirely. The whole predication of their views is not rationally justifiable if it is based on faith.
Indeed, it also ignores, in favour of singling out this one case, the millions who are ruthlessly exploited by ‘right wing ideologues’ who have turned political opposition to liberalism and the extension of faith to the most irrational extremes into a multi-billion dollar business. Whatever the rationalities of this one man who objected to being caught up in Obama’s generalisation, it is not a reason to promote the extension of religious faith, no matter the progressive-sounding banner it parades under.
The common-sense argument here is the reification of religion into something which can ‘reclaimed’ from the fundamentalists who currently occupy it, regardless of the concrete social relations and situations which are driving that fundamentalism. This is unmistakably an ideological position and it is most certainly one that is indulged in without serious discussion amongst its proponents.
Ironic then, that Tony Blair and his cadre are among those so vociferous in their denunciation of the Labour left as ‘ideological.’ This is one of the enduring warnings of the New Labour, post-modern era: be wary of those who approach under the flag of truisms and neutrality. They are often the most ‘ideological’ of all.
I don’t know how many people picked up on 
Though it has been some time since new Russian President, Dmitri Medvedev, was sworn into office, I am only now glancing over some of the pictures of the pomp and circumstance with which the event was staged. I must confess to seeing some bitter ironies in certain elements of the proceedings, which are pictured on the right.
On Comment is Fallacious I noticed an article entitled ‘
Ever since I was a small child, I have utterly detested the Eurovision song contest. Far from being a display of the diversity of the Europe whilst simultaneously showing how we can all get along, the contest has been marked by the social chauvinism of that dinosaur Wogan and the drab and ridiculous soft pop acts of nations which should stick to manufacturing alcohol.
We may as well redesign the flag with S-Club 7 on the front of it, if this sort of music is the standard bearer of the UK.
I was reading today on “
I first came across Slavoj Zizek about five years ago when an American situationist friend of mine linked me to an article of his
Recent Comments