Why socialists are talking bollox on Greece and the euro
There are a striking number of self-declared British socialists expressing the view that Greece will be better off just defaulting on its debts and leaving the euro. Leaving the euro, goes the argument, will be a victory for the Greek people, and a real slap in the face for the Merkelian forces of austerity.
This is total bollocks. It’s also totally unsocialist.
Leaving the euro (and re-establishing the Drachma) may well be exceedingly good for a few Greeks, but it will be very bad news indeed for the vast majority.
While it’s impossible to say exactly how leaving the Eurozone might pan out, these will be among the consequences*:
- Within a day of the creation and flotation of the New Drachma (probably only electronic and virtual at first as it will take three to four months to print a new currency in sufficient quantities), its value will crash against ‘hard’ currencies, and the purchasing power of Greeks for anything imported will be slashed. It’s impossible to know by how much, but a cut of 75% purchasing power is certainly not out of the question.
- In an internationalized economy like Greece, there is no such thing as ‘out of the euro’. Most rich Greeks able to do so will already have stored their wealth elsewhere and the capital flight will continue to happen. The idea of proper capital controls is frankly fanciful. As holders of still-valid euros, or other ‘hard’ currencies, they will then be in position to purchase both the assets and labour of the mass majority of increasingly desperate Greeks at rock-bottom rates.
- A dual economy will swiftly emerge, as in pretty well all countries without their own hard currencies. This will further deepen inequalities in daily life, potentially even with usual services and products only available to those with access to hard currency, as will the emergence of black market currency trading, where the New Drachma is even less valuable than at the official exchange rate.
- This might be exacerbated by the government seeking (understandably) to gather its tax revenues in hard currencies, although for the long-term it is better off using taxes collected in New Drachma as a way of stabilising and promoting its use within the wider economy (cf. by way of contrast Bristol City Council’s innovative plans to accept business rates payment in the “Bristol pound” as a way of promoting its use as a tool for local economic sustainability).
In short, then, it seems bizarre that socialists should be arguing for a ’resolution’ to the current crisis, whereby ordinary Greeks fall prey to even greater exploitation, and wealth inequalities become even starker.
Fortunately, the signs are that SYRZIA have decent economists, who realise what the official exit from the Eurozone would mean for their constituents. While they are firm in their commitment to ending self-defeating austerity, they have already stated that they want Greece to remain in the Eurozone.
If British and other European socialists really want to help their comrades in Greece, they would be better off stopping the reality-free anti-German rhetoric, and starting to throw up alternatives that might assist their Greek comrades, as the latter enter an inevitable period of brinkmanship with Merkel and the European Commission.
One alternative already exists, of course. This, as our very own union economist Duncan Weldon has set out, is through “artificial devaluation”:
By imposing a duty on imports and equal subsidy to exports a country can, in effect, devalue its currency without leaving the Eurozone. A, say, 15% surcharge on imports and a 15% subsidy to exports in Greece would be effectively a 15% devaluation in the currency.
As these countries run deficits it would, at first, be fiscally beneficial as the surcharge on imports outweighed the costs of subsidised exports.
When Duncan mooted this to economist colleagues in Rome the other week, he wasn’t laughed out of the room in the way he might have been a year ago. Of course there is a reluctance even to think about tinkering with the fundamentals of the Single Market in this way, but as ‘eurogeddon’ approaches for both Greece and the rest of Europe, a temporary fix like this may start to seem an awful lot more attractive, and it might be possible to reach a compromise which includes a fix like this alongside a further debt ‘haircut’ for creditors, in a way which allows both Merkel and co claim that they’ve not let the Greeks of scot-free, but bringing the debt repayments into the realms of the achievable (or at least creating a breathing space while a new haircut plan is developed).
For ordinary Greeks, artificial devaluation would also mean a major hike in prices, just as leaving the euro would, but at least it would affect ALL Greeks. That may be preferable to a massive and permanent shift in the balance of financial muscle in favour of the part of the population that got them into this mess in the first place.
The question for socialists outside Greece is whether they prefer an end to this crisis which leave Merkel with egg on her face but the Greek people destitute, or one which lets Merkel leave office without the eggy bits but keeps the Greek people somewhere above the bread line.
Call me a hoary old social democrat washout, but I know which I prefer.
* For a much more detailed assessment of how the euro would end as the national currency of Greece, and the New Drachma be established, Modern Monetary Theorists like Edward Harrison and Marshall Auerbach are helpful.
Note, however, that they favour exit from the euro and the establishment of the New Drachma because they fail (or do not want) to see the economic consequences for real people, preferring instead to see Greece as a test case for their theories about how a new currency might be established through the use of coercive currency switching (aka. theft) and Drachma-based taxation. They also appear totally unrealistic about the capacity of the Greek government to impose its political will throughout its bureaucratic machinery.
Hi Paul – this is all stuff I’ve been trying to get my head around recently. If Greece left (or more likely was kicked out) of the Eurozone, could a Greek government make the decision to fix their currency at 1-1 with the Euro, like we used to have fixed exchange rates with the pound? Or is that a stupid question…
Edd
I don’t think there are any “stupid questions” anymore.
Fixing at 1:1 would simply be a statement to the effect that “we are still in the Euro but we’re just calling it the Drachma.” It wouldn’t change the legal debt obligations, a resolution of which is a necessary conduit to some kind of hard to low currency transfer. Thus short of the ‘pure’ MMT solution (which I think is utterly unworkable for the reasons outlined, but also deeply economically uneqaulising in itself), Greece would be buggered in the short term.
A fixed rate at, let’s say, 1: 0.5 or 1:0.3 might work in some ways, as pegged undervaluation has worked in China, but it’s easy to underestimate how easily a massive currency black market (and with knock-on effects to the further development of the informal untaxed economy in general) would soon absolutely dominate the Greek economy, given that it is much more open than the Chinese one (it is an interesting question as to what the state of the informal Chinese currency economy is – i don’t know).
That’s my off-the-cuff response, but it’s an interesting idea you pose, and i mau have missed something that means it might work.
Sorry, should have also said that a 1: 1 fix wouldn’t do anything to improve balance of payments by increasing cost of imports vs cost of exports
Interesting post.
To push back a little, a devaluation would act to decrease unemployment by pushing down labour costs so the pain would be more evenly spread than it is at the moment.
Secondly, I think everyone citing the example of Argentina forgets how unpopular the things that went along with the devaluation were. Things like the Corralito.
Still, I think you underestimate how difficult adjustment will be under any plan, the advantage of default, drachmatise, devalue, is that it gets it all over with.
LO
Yes, I accept that the immediate ‘DDD’ option you outline may have advantages, but my concern is that commentators have, in their turn, underestimated the effect it would have on the very social fabric of Greece through the creation of an even greater informal economy etc.. While there are still options that might avoid such total meltdown at a societal level, I think it behoves sensible socialists to examine what these are and whether they might be workable.
Is there any real difference between your views and those of PASOK? The problem is that retaining the Euro is not an option: it is not going to last. And Greece is merely the kicking off point: Spain, Italy, Portugal are already close behind and most of the eastern EU countries are even worse off than Greece.
This is a massive crisis and to deal with it people are going to have to start thinking in new ways. Or, as Cobbett would have said, old ways. What is important is to feed, house, care for, clothe, provide fuel for and otherwise protect the population. That is the job of Greece’s government and to do it will probably necessitate taking over command of the commanding heights of the economy.
As to defaulting, what is being proposed is a public audit of the debt and a suspension of interest payments until it is completed.
I think I agree with Ellis – though I’d phrase it differently. For Syriza, the choice may come down to a stark decision over remaining in the euro OR pursuing their anti-austerity agenda, because the European elite may force it to. If they concede the austerity point, to remain in the Euro, that goes down PASOK’s road of capitulation. If they are serious about anti-austerity, they’ll leave the euro – but to do that, they’d have to swing much further left, and that will mean mass nationalisation.
The Greek elites may well escape from Greece – but the aim of socialists in other countries is to ensure that Greece is merely the first domino, not the last.
Your ‘socialist’ reply looks very much like the bankers reply. You can’t pull out there will be blood it will be awful grannies will lose their savings…
Go and look at argentina – everyone said the world would end and within 6 months they were better off, within 5 years vastly so, on the back of that prosperity a governemnt of the left has been able to do some good stuff.
What you say about the dual economy etc is based on whose experience? The closest parallels Iceland, Argentia, and indeed the uk when it left the erm, did well after devaluing and did not have the kind of problems you suggest. Italy And why on earth would greece try and collect taxes in ‘hard currency’ when as you suggest it is obviously a bad idea and would be staggeringly unpopular with an electorate paid in Drachmas?
Also it is a bit odd for someone on the left (even ‘unsocialist’) to rule out a solution because of threats from the mobility of capital. In this case much of the damage is ineveitable, and such flows will need to be dealt with both at a Greek and EU level. Clearly currency controls are a big part of the answer – see Iceland’s relatively successful solution to the problems you outline. What the free anti-German rhetoric you refer to is I not sure, I am sure some people are Xenophobic and that is always stupid, but for once I think people are right to blame ‘the Germans’ or rather the current German government, they have dictated the disasterous Austerity-based policy response. Any other solution will be bad for the Greeks and will waste billions more.
No! Your socialist response is very colse to the bankers one – ‘there will be blood grannies will lose their pensions’, etc. Of course no option now available is ideal but people said the same about argentina leaving the dollar peg, within 6 months they were better off and in 5 years they were much better off. On the back of that growth a government of the left has won several elections and done some good stuff for the poor I do not see why something similar should not happen in greece.
Most of the consequences you sight seem rather unlikely – the nearest paralels – Argetina when it left the dollar peg, Britian when it fell out of the ERM, Iceland’s response to the current crisis which involved capital controls – did not display any of these effects, and why a Greek government would collect taxes in ‘hard currency’ when it would be both economically unsound and staggeringly unpopular with an electorate paid in drachmas, I cannot imagine.
Citing capital flight as an objection is a council of despair for the left – currency controls are surely part of the answer as they have been in Iceland’s successful and relatively egalitarian response to meltdown.
What the critisism of Germany you refer to is I cannot be sure, and to be sure xenophobia is always wrong but for once it seems to me the critique of Germany, or rather the german government, is right. They have pushed the ‘Confidence will only come if you bleed’ agenda hardest and with disaterous results. Anyway, Greek exit from the Euro is not only right, it is also going to happen so bollox or not you would do well to respond to the world as you find it.
An excellent article, it is the Greek people who will suffer when and if they leave the euro.
The pain of such a withdrawal would be immense.
If you think that the Greek neo-Nazis are big now just watch them grow and grow, it is frightening to think how big they could become.
In other news, Nikolaos Mihaloliakos, Golden Dawn’s leader, has come out as an open Holocaust denier.
“In other news, Nikolaos Mihaloliakos, Golden Dawn’s leader, has come out as an open Holocaust denier.”
Well that changes everything, here was me thinking he was simply rabid anti Muslim and a virulent Islamophobe!
I think Greece has more room for bargaining than this article suggests. Austerity is on the back foot, the Austerity parties are facing meltdown. A Greek capitulation would be a disaster. All people’s of Europe should now be in open revolt against Austerity, we can win this battle.
Costas Lapavitsas,
“By the end of 2012 austerity will have led to contraction of the Greek economy by 20%, a jump in unemployment toward 25%, a full-blown humanitarian crisis in the urban centres, and a completely unmanageable public debt. Greece is dying on its feet. Meanwhile its old political class twitters on about participating in the European “game” and making structural reforms that will bring growth in the future”
Add yourself to the twitters.
http://www.coalitionofresistance.org.uk/2012/05/why-europe-needs-greece/
Edgar hits the point dead on the nose. The OP, which is mostly cobblers rather than cogent argument, doesn’t offer a valid comparison. The choice is not between “OMFG leave the euro = kaboomz” and something better, it’s between economic meltdown compounded by an austerity-promoting ruling class that intends making sure that Greeks pay for this crisis for decades, not just the next few years.
There’s a reason, after all, that the pro-austerity parties won’t form another “coalition of salvation” – because they know that without the covering support of Syriza, to guard their Left flank, they might face chaos, with general strikes all over the place and workers simply refusing to listen to the government’s dictat. Syriza’s problem is that it’s not ideologically equipped to lead that sort of movement.
Therein lies the key problem; if Syriza grasped that nettle, then it could easily give the lead to Italy and Spain, potentially Portugal and Ireland – and there are plenty in this country and in France and Germany ready for outright revolt, as Edgar puts it. It would push us to the front and give our arguments more force.
I’ve been meaning to ask, though, Paul, didn’t you write an article not terribly long ago bemoaning how the new EU treaty practically outlawed Keynesian economic responses?
My loca,l Toronto, paper agrees with me:
“….Faced with a stark choice, people will simply not agree to have their lives destroyed to protect the common European currency.
“That is the meaning of this month’s Greek elections in which anti-austerity parties captured 60 per cent of the popular vote.
“So yes, the euro as it exists now is surely finished. Just as, in 1931, the gold standard was finished.
“Britain went off the gold standard “temporarily” in September of that year and never returned. Altogether, some 25 nations followed suit.
“The events of 1931 were wrenching. A banking crisis enveloped Europe, in part because financial institutions found themselves holding government debt that was effectively worthless.
“The prevailing wisdom then was that European countries in trouble had to find their own way out of the mess. The prevailing wisdom now, as articulated by U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner (and echoed this week by Canadian Finance Minister Jim Flaherty) is that Europe must solve its problems with little or no help from the rest of the world.
“It was a short-sighted prescription in 1931. It is equally myopic now.
“The international economy is set to go over the cliff. Greece has called the eurozone’s bluff. One of the world’s major currencies is at risk. Too many financial institutions hold murky assets that may come apart as the euro unravels….”
The parallel with the Gold Standard and 1931 is particularly instructive.
Our blogger is taking the same position that Philip Snowden and Ramsay Mac took in 1931 when, to save the pound and implement austerity policies, they broke the Labour Party. Then, as now, there were those to describe these “courageous” attacks on working class living standards as being “socialist.” Now, as then, they are wrong: the Greek people, on the other hand are right in rejecting supervised suicide.
A great post from Yanis Varoufakis today on this. He’s been consistent in arguing for Greece to default while remaining in the eurozone. And has published detailed recommendations co-authored with Stuart Holland, which readers of this blog might be interested in.
Continuing from before……
So I think I am misrepresented here by claims that I am in favour of some acceptance or other of austerity. I am in fact simply supporting the current SYRZIA line of refusing austerity while defending the right to use the euro. Of course much depends on how far they are prepared to go with the brinkmanship, but they have the advantage (which PASOK didn’t have, even with the weird referendum that never was) that the main players on the other side of the table a) are desperate for a fix, given the contagion risk (bank deposits may flow from Italy/Spain before negotiations anyway); b) don’t know whether SYRZIA will push the nuclear button. As Edgar says above, they have more bargaining power than most seem to think (though I’m not clear why he accuses me of underestimating it, since that’s a key part of my argument for SYRZIA’s capacity to both refuse austerity and retain the euro).
Moving on to some specifics:
The Argentina model: I think the Yanis article that Agog links to above (Thanks, Agog) does a better job than I can of showing how different Argentina is from Greece. As he say, fair play to the Argentines for doing what they did, but they did so as a primary producer with great export potential AND an ability to import substitute (esp food), with a working currency in place (as did Iceland) and with trading partners. Greece has none of those things, and it’s not realistic to think that leaving the euro will do anything other than impoversh mnay/most Greeks in the medium term. First and foremost, Greece is hugely dependent on ffuel and food imports, and if the govt soup kitchens can’t afford the food, large scale hunger awaits.
I actually think a better comparator for Greece is Algeria in the late 80s-early 90s: a country with its elite hitherto supported by Soviet geopolitical patronage but a moribund economy (espeically with oil prices dipping) based on a two-tier currency (dinars vs hard currency) suddenly sees itself cut off from the basics and food riots erupts. Eventually, this leads to the election of an Islamist party promising a very different vision of the future, and then very bloody civil war.
Dave, you say: “Therein lies the key problem; if Syriza grasped that nettle, then it could easily give the lead to Italy and Spain, potentially Portugal and Ireland – and there are plenty in this country and in France and Germany ready for outright revolt…” Elsewhere you talk of SYRZIA seizing the commanding heights of the economy, although I’ve tried to show above that there isn’t much of an economy to seize.
I’m not sure what nettle you’re suggesting should be grabbed. They’ve said they won’t accept austerity. if they win, then yes indeed that might lead to other countries doing similar, but if they only win by losing the euro (or the govt and working-class Greeks losing it while those with the wherewithal for capital flight continue to enjoy and exploit) then they plunge their people into penury. I don’t see that as a great example to set. Let me repeat: they are trying to fight off austerity while retaining the only currency which works for them (and I in turn am suggesting a way which might strengthen their arm at the bargaining table). There is even an option to leave the EU temporarily as part of this (to avoid the Single market illegality and therefore make it easier for other countires to accept) while staying in the euro.
Finally, you suggest I’m contradicting myself because I’ve also set out Keyensianism has been “made illegal”. That has little to do with the question of the euro, since much of the six-pack regulation applies to all countries in the EU anyway, In any event I don’t see it as a contradiction to, on the one hand, warn that legislation has been introduced as an attempt to enforce neoliberalism (following Germany’s unpunished breach of the original Stabiltiy Pact in 2002 following reunification). and on the other to advocate SYRZIA’s current bargaining line.
Away yesterday, so it’ll have to be – at least for starters – a round up reply to the comments rather chronological. I’m sure you let me know where I miss specfics. Thanks, first off, for the (relative) civility of replies – I assumed this post would raise heckles (and I was a bit controversial with the headline in a shameless attempt to attract readership).
Generally, the comments drift towards the assumption that I support something close to the status quo, with a renegotiation of the current debt terms but still the need for an austerity package as a condition for remaining in the euro. From Ellis, for example:
“Our blogger is taking the same position that Philip Snowden and Ramsay Mac took in 1931 when, to save the pound and implement austerity policies, they broke the Labour Party. Then, as now, there were those to describe these “courageous” attacks on working class living standards as being “socialist.” Now, as then, they are wrong: the Greek people, on the other hand are right in rejecting supervised suicide.”
I am quite clear in my post, however, that I do not support any form of austerity. What I support is the right of the Greek people, support for which is expressed by SYRZIA, to remain within the euro while rejecting austerity. The only conditions under which some of the debt might be retained should be where it is low enough to manage AND reduce over time under ‘normal’ (let’s say 2-3% GDP per year) growth, although additional conditions might also be agreed with a SYRZIA-led government about its timetable to ‘complete’ its tax collection capability (a major task probably better undetaken in the short term through property taxation).
I wonder whether the leftwing reaction to my post (I’ll come back to the rightwing reaction to the Liberal Conspiracy edit of the post) might have been different if I’d framed it differently. Take a step back, comrades/colleagues and ask yourself if you’d have been as hostile to a post which said that SYRZIA was totally correct to oppose austerity in any form, but also to defend the right of the Greek working class to run their lives in a currency which better meets their material needs. Has my (perhaps mistaken) framing of the argument in terms of ‘revolutionary socialists wrong’ vs ‘me right’ altered your reading of it?
Sorry, got to go out, but will leave this offering just to show I want to engage properly, byut just struggling with time – more 6pm ish I hope
To be clear – comments 16 and 17 were written 17, then 16, but I mucked up the box I was supposed to put them in