I’m not blogging much at the moment, but I still abide by my golden rule of blogging: if I happen to come across some twat misusing PISA results in defence of Gove, then I will always make a point of calling her/him out, if I can be arsed.
So there’s a total twat, Toby Young by name, misusing PISA results in defence of Gove, and I can be arsed.
Young says, in a piece ‘fisking’ the apparently “hysterical” Suzanne Moore*:
Ah. Here we go. Her [Moore's] views are “evidence-based”, Gove’s are “ideological”. Odd line of argument for a former employee of Marxism Today to pursue, but there it is. In fact, there’s plenty of evidence to support Gove’s policies. Here’s evidence that standards fell during Labour’s 13 years in office. Here’s evidence that free schools have raised standards in Sweden. Here’s evidence that increasing school choice has raised standards in England. Here’s evidence that the academies programme is raising standards in England.
The first link is to the wikipedia entry on the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA).
And this is what the Chair of the UK Statistics Authority had to say about the blatant misuse of PISA data by Ofsted and the DfE:
While I understand that some users of these data would like to make comparisons between the first PISA study in 2000 and the most recent in 2009, the weaknesses relating to the response-rate standard in earlier studies should not be ignored. The validity of comparisons of national rankings as a result of an increase in the number of countries covered by the PISA study, and the degrees of uncertainty in country scores attributed to sampling and measurement error are also important in this regard.
That is, Young is totally and utterly wrong**. More on why he’s wrong here***, here, here and, just for completeness sake, the National Foundation for Educational Research review of the PISA 2009 study:
England’s performance in 2009 does not differ greatly from that in the last Pisa survey in 2006.
* Readers may wish to note James Delingpole’s delightful metaphor on twitter for Young’s attempted fisking of the “hysterical” Moore. I can’t remember where I put it though. Anyway, it’s bound to cause a twitterstorm so you may see it before I see it again.
** Of course, it’s not just that he’s deliberately misusing the PISA data. His logic is also utterly at sea. Even valid evidence that England may have fallen down the international ranking wouldn’t be proof that standards have fallen. It might be as easily explained by other countries getting better (oh, and the huge increase in the number of countries in the rankings).
*** , I note that I asked, in this post about the Chair of the UK Statistics Authority’s October ’12 letter:
Will they continue to peddle the same untruths, secure in the knowledge that the “plummeting down the international league tables” is now well entrenched as a result of lies to date, and much more likely to gain press coverage than a letter from the UK Statistics Authority?
I think we now know the answer.
Our public life is being corrupted by a permanent sneer and cynical outlook by those who report on it. Yes, to some extent it’s the fault of those who serve in public life. The trouble is that the way politics is now reported in the print and broadcast media, it’s a wonder anyone wants to go into it.
His plaint puts me in mind of Colin Hay’s marvellous 2007 Why We Hate Politics. While Iain blames the decline of res publica on sociological and agential changes – the idea the people who now collectively make up the body politic and the political media are just worse people than their predecessors – Hay prefers to focus on the political and ideological roots (which are in turn rooted in the material structure of capitalism and its neoliberal/public choice turn):
[T]he systematic questioning of the motives of political actors and public servants has its origins in the projection of instrumental assumptions on to such actors. This, in turn, can be traced to the development of public choice theory within political science in the 1960s and 1970s, and its growing influence on public policy in the 1980s. The extent to which such assumptions are true is an index of the degree to which it is irrational to trust politicians and public servants to act in the collective interest. Consequently, the extent to which such assumptions are believed is likely to be an index of the rational disengagement of the electorate rom the political process. It would certainly seem as though public choice’s theory’s cynicism with respect to the motivations of political actors is now deeply shared (p.4).
So the ideology that drove Iain’s beloved Thatcherism is essentially responsible for the collapse of Iain’s faith in politics. A sweet irony, indeed.
More importantly for our purposes, Hay’s structural explanation is also relevant to Jon’s more politically mature analysis:
The tenor of the complaints about MPs’ expenses has always been anti-political. It gives us no sense of what politics is for, only what we hate about it. It teaches us to hate politicians not for the shitty things they might do, but because they are politicians in the first place. It resigns us to our fate. Furthermore, it is something that has been pushed aggressively by the media elite and members of the business lobby with less than noble motives, something not considered by those who gleefully joined the anti-duck house brigade when all this shit started. We can have a sensible politics conducive to the building of a better society, or we can have a politics based on this childish posturing. We can’t have both.
Agreed. The question, though, is how we move towards a “sensible politics”. John’s implicitly agent-focused answer seems to be that we should all grow up, be a bit less “childish”. Yet the idea that we can just agree to do things differently is less of a realistic proposition than it sounds, given the ideological drag, and the ever-present assumption that, deep down, everyone’s in it to maximise their narrow self-interest.
Perhaps, as Chris has suggested, the only way we can really achieve a grown-up (Habermasian?) politics is to change the economic structure which made those politics how they now are, and how they are now perceived, in the first place.
Alex Massie at the Spectator thinks the government may be gilding the high speed lily:
I suspect the economic case for the proposals is weaker than its proponents allow.
The governnment ‘s Economic Case for HS2: Updated appraisal of transport user benefits and wider economic benefits, published to justify the London-Birmingham stretch says )para 3.5.4)
There may also be significant local effects; for instance, a new station can act as a magnet for economic activity and drive regeneration in deprived areas.
You’d have thought that for a £32bn scheme there might be a bit more than a ‘may’, and some actual research into its possible and likely consequences for the areas concerned.
After a few paragraphs of vague wish lists about what ‘wider economic impacts’ (WEIs) the scheme might bring in the form of business clustering and labour markets, we get this at 3.5.8 of the same report:
The WEIs guidance is carefully designed to measure national impacts. However, at a regional and local level the effects of HS2 on the distribution of activity could also be very significant.
Is “could” better than “may”?
Then, finally, we get to the nub (para 3.5.9-10):
[A]lthough there are many examples where growth and regeneration has been delivered around a high speed rail station, there may be balancing effects across the wider area. However, the circumstances in which, and extent to which, this happens is not clear….
These local impacts are considered more fully in the Review of HS2 London to West Midlands Appraisal of Sustainability report.
But if you’re anal enough to go to the Review of HS2 London to West Midlands Appraisal of Sustainability report, it runs out that no such consideration has been given (para 1.3.1):
In undertaking this assessment account has been taken of the socio-economic impact of transport schemes including other high speed rail schemes. It is commonly accepted that the main impact on land use, of new stations or improved services, is located within a 10-15 minutes walking distance of the station, which equates to a catchment area of 1km.
Thus, the report is not by, any stretch of the imagination, an assessment of wider impacts. That’s not what 1km from a station is. That’s a local impact assessment. Indeed the report acknowledges this when at para .1.3.5):
The next steps in developing the socio-economic appraisal may be to……investigate the wider regional impacts of high speed rail, for example, how the Black Country region would be affected by the introduction of High Speed Rail to Birmingham (para 1.3.5.).
In summary, then the wider regional impact investigation recommended in the previous report has not been undertaken, but the final report published by the government pretends that it has.
Call me old-fashhioned, but I think that’s lying.
And this is not simply an esoteric point about what is and isn’t in what DfT document.
This is about the spending of £33bn on a scheme which has the real capacity to wreak havoc on people in towns and cities – most likely some distance from the new stations but close enough to see economic activity “sucked away”.
As I set out here, such concerns are summed up in a 2009 paper ‘High Speed Rail: Lessons for Policy Makers from Experiences Abroad’, in which the authors study the actual post-construction impact of schemes in Japan, France, Spain and Italy:
[F]or regions and cities whose economic conditions compare unfavorably with those of their neighbors, a connection to the HST line may even result in economic activities being drained away and an overall negative impact……Medium size cities may well be the ones to suffer most from the economic attraction of the more dynamic, bigger cities. Indeed, Haynes (1997) points out that growth is sometimes at the expense of other centers of concentration.
Time will tell whether my concerns are justified, but what we can already be certain of is that £32bn of public money is to be spent on a scheme which has not been properly research, and the justification for which is underpinned by quiet, but important, lie in the small print.
Meanwhile, the £60m it would cost (about 1/500th of what’s needed for HSR) to build a rail link to Skelmersdale’s 40,000 residents to any railway at all is still not forthcoming.
The Sun says:
DAVID Cameron wants power to boot out foreign terror suspects as part of a deal to keep Britain in the EU.
The PM’s “bottom line” is to wrest control back from meddling European judges.
He is furious 3,000 criminals and terror suspects are using human rights laws to fight deportation from the UK.
The issue will be his key demand when he sits down to thrash out a looser EU deal.
If that is Cameron’s key demand, it may at least amuse his fellow heads of state when he starts banging his fists at the negotiating tablem given that European Court of Human Rights is an institution of the 47 member Council of Europe, and has nothing at all to do with the European Union.
You couldn’t make it up etc. etc.
In my main post on Cameron’s EU debacle earlier, I noted how the European Union Act 2011, pushed through by Cameron as a way of deflecting attention from his failure to live up to his “cast iron” guarantee on a referendum, is likely to come back to haunt him.
It occurs to me that one part of his speech illustrates this cock-up perfectly. Cameron asks:
And I would ask: when the competitiveness of the single market is so important, why is there an environment council, a transport council, an education council but not a single market council?
So Cameron apparently wants an addiitional institution within the EU to coordinate single market policy. I’m not sure why, but let’s take him at his word.
Now, the function of the transport council, which he refers to by way of comparison, is set out at Articles 90 to 96 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Similarly, if a single market were to be established as a result Cameron’s negotiating brilliance, it would also require inclusion within a revised TFEU if it were to have legitimacy
But the European Union Act 2011 makes ot very clear that a change to TFEU which entails “the extension of the competence of the EU in relation to cooridnation of economic and employment policies” (sec 4 (f) will require a referendum for its ratification.
So if Cameron were successful in negotiating a new Single Market coordination function, AND if legislation were introduced for an in/out referendum, we’d be stuck, by law, with two referenda, potentially weeks apart.
Yesterday’s Financial Times leader reflects on its own research, which finds that “pupils in London’s poorest neighbourhoods are outperforming average students in the regions”:
Much is still unknown about why London is doing so well. But some credit can be given to the initiative known as London Challenge, regrettably scrapped by the coalition in 2010. This helped to create an ecosystem of experts and schools to identify weaknesses and share best practice. Ofsted, the schools regulator, has praised its impact on student performance.
Government policy has since focused on expanding academies, which are free from local authority control. But autonomy alone is not the answer. The world’s best school systems have high levels of autonomy. So do some of the worst. The experience of London Challenge and successful academies shows that collaboration between high and underperforming schools and informal benchmarking are as important.
Successive governments have tried and failed to address the blight of underperformance in areas such as Doncaster or Yarmouth. There are many contributing factors, such as a lack of expectations fuelled by a dearth of job opportunities. But it is urgent that the lessons of London’s success be translated to these regions.
Policy makers should test a new initiative in some underperforming cities. Local commissioners could be appointed to co-ordinate education experts, teachers and business. This group could help to identify weaknesses and foster collaboration between schools to spread best practice. This cannot be a short-term experiment. Previous attempts to replicate London’s success were abandoned too soon. Improving schools is a five to 10-year task, which means there has to be cross-party consensus on how to deal with these educational deserts. The future of Britain’s children depends on it.
The disjuncture between analysis and conclusion here is stark: we simply don’t know what the main influence on educational achievement in London is – broadly, whether it’s changing to the education, or changes amongst the cohorts being educated – but the recommendation for action focuses on what to do about schools.
Indeed, the conclusion seems to contradict other recent analysis by Chris Cook, the FT’s excellent education correspondent and data geek hero. Chris finds that only in a very few schools do poorer children (those eligible for Free School Meals) achieve better than the national average. That is, in the country as a whole, the quality of the school generally matters a great deal less to a child’s educational achievement than does that family income of that child. Moreover, in another benchmarking exercise, he finds that “two-thirds of the variation in children’s exam results can be explained without any reference to the quality of the school at all.”
So why is it different in London? Are the schools really so much better that they are able to counteract the influence of poverty in ways that so few schools elsewhere are able to?
The answer is a “yes, probably”. It does look as though the London Challenge, in particular, had a beneficial effect in the way the FT leader sets out, based on collaboration and a virtual circle of best practice, as well perhaps as making the most of London’s undoubted educationalist talent pool. After all, even children arriving from other English regions after the age of 11 seem to end up doing better than their peers who stayed in the regions.
But, given what we know from the statistics, there must also be other causes – something specific about London itself, not just its schools, which has driven up achievement so much more there in the last 10 years, compared with other regions.
This other something is, I suspect, immigration. As I set out in some detail here and here, there is already really quite compelling evidence to suggest the cognitive and social advantages of emergent bilingualism and biculturalism has been powerful enough to overcome the economic disadvantages suffered by many of them. This particularity about the shift in the type of children educated in London in the last decade will, I suspect, turn out to have been a more powerful cause of improved educational achievement than anything that the schools themselves have done. There’s a PhD or two waiting to be done in the field.
Such PhD findings are likely to be very unpopular with government (of any colour, as it stands), who will be more than happy to stick with the convenient, but wrong, assumption, that improving educational achievement is just a matter of improving schools (and outright governmental corruption currently flows from that assumption).
Nevertheless, it’s important that pro-immigrations keep on making the case for diversity, not just on the basis that it creates a better educated workforce, but because well-educated diversity flows creates a more prosperous, productive country as a whole. As Alesine et al. (2013) find (h/t Chris Dillow) from their extensive research into the economic effects of birthplace diversity*, there is:
a positive and robust correlation between birthplace diversity and productivity. This association is particularly strong for the diversity of immigrants, especially for skilled immigrants in richer countries. Expanding the diversity of skilled immigration by one standard deviation (e.g., from Iran to Ireland, or Ireland to US) increases long-run real income by a factor of 1.2 to 1.5. These results hold for OLS and 2SLS estimators in a dataset of 93 countries and are robust to a wide range of alternative speci.cations. We interpret these findings as suggestive of production function effects of diversity. These effects can theoretically arise though complementarities in skills, cognitive abilities or problem solving capabilities that emerge from the combination of workers with diverse origins in a joint production task. Such positive production function effects have been uncovered in a number of recent empirical and experimental studies at the team and .rm levels, but evidence at an aggregate level had so far been limited to US cities and states. These results have potentially strong implications for the design of immigration policies (p.21).
In the short term, of course, it’s too much too expect that the life chances of people in South Yorkshire (to take one “poorly performing” area in the FT research) will be enhanced by a new wave of productive immigration with a dynamic similar to that in London (or early 20th century New York); however desirable that may be for the open-minded, it just ain’t going to happen. Nevertheless, what it’s important for Labour policymakers to bear in mind, as they prepare to take over after Gove’s scorched earth period of misuse of office, is that further initiatives to improve education in such areas need to be developed more holistically than the FT leader above recommends.
We need to develop ways in which schools and the wider institutions of the state are able to instil in whole communities the affinity for educational achievement which currently marks out London from the rest. Some of this is, of course, related to economic opportunity – the desire to get good results in order to get that job which is actually available, but it’s also about creating a love of learning for learning’s sake amongst children, either through initiatives with parents (e.g. the creation of 21st century ‘reading rooms’ in schools or run by schools) and/or, where need be, in loco parentis.
This, of course, needs money. And lots of it. But if there’s one New Labour achievement that One Nation Labour should be keen to celebrate and build on, it’s Education, Education, Education. The FT agrees.
* The notion of birthplace diversity, as opposed to ethnic diversity, is important, because it is the very newness that creates the kind of surge of achievement we have seen in London in the last decade. As the study says (p.2):
Albeit loosely linked through immigration, ethnic and birthplace diversity are empirically (perhaps surprisingly) almost completely uncorrelated. Conceptually, ethnic and birthplace diversity also di¤er as people born in different countries are likely to have been educated in di¤erent school systems, learned di¤erent skills, and speak different languages; once gathered in a single country, .rst-generation immigrants arguably form a more diverse group than second and third-generation immigrants (or than people of di¤erent ethnicities) that grew up speaking the same language and, more often than not, learned from each other inside or outside of school: the melting pot does indeed melt!
Since Friday, when white people started fighting there, it seems anyone who’s anyone in the mainstream media is an expert on Mali. Funny that.
I’m no expert, but back in April 2012, I wrote:
Meanwhile in Africa, a nascent democracy has fallen, a large part of the country is in the hands of a different number of armed groups with differing levels of affiliation to Al Qaeida, trouble is spilling over into neighbouring countries and refugees are on the move. All this is happening as a direct result of the UK’s last major military intervention.
I speak, of course, of Mali, and the vast desert area referred to as Azawad by those Tourags who seek its independence. Over the weekend the major town Timbuktu and Gao have fallen to Touareg rebels, taking strategic advantage of the recent coup d’etat. This coup d’etat was itself undertaken by a section of the army supposedly as a reaction to the civilian government’s inability to deal with armed rebellion in the North, and that armed rebellion was fuelled by the massive overspill of weaponry from Libya via Niger into the desert regions of Mali.
In the mix are various groups, with confused and confusing allegiance, and including the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the (Islamist) Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) , the (Islamist) Ansar al-Din and of course Al Qaeida Middle East (AQIM), present in one form or another (from bases in Southern Algeria).
More details are here, courtesy of the very excellent Kal at The Moor Next Door. There’s a handy map here. I don’t pretend to out-analyse Kal on the specifics of what are and what will be in the region, but simply ask the questions: do Cameron and Hague now accept that what seemed like a nice Boys’ Own Adventure is turning out to have very nasty consequences not just for the millions now directly affected (Mali’s population is 16 million to Libya’s 6 million) but potentially for the much of the Sahel and into the West African states?
Nine months on, we know a few more details of those “nasty consequences”. There is open war in Mali. Ansaru in Nigeria are explicitly linking their activities to Mali. Senegal is scared of what may be coming. Mauritania, in its fragile state, is unable to restrict the movements of jihadists through its territories and prey to attack on its own towns, and Niger – already beset by major ecnonomic and environmental problems, will only suffer more from the growing regional instability.
Now if I, from a backroom in Lancashire, armed with nothing more than an internet connection and a keen sense of the unintended consequence, was able nine months ago to predict pretty well how things would pan out, then it must all have been pretty damn predictable. You’d have thought, in such circumstances, the anti-war left would have had something to say in the way of prevention.
Yet by and large, none of the people or organisations now so desperate to comment on what are, by any yardstick, serious, bloody events with huge consequences for the people of the Sahel region and beyond, had anything to say as, little by little over the summer months, the groups who had been fighting for territorial independence ceded ground and towns to those with more Jihadi aims, and it became clearer that the assault on human freedoms in Northern Malian desert towns would soon be in assaults in Central Mali.
In the end, I can’t help feeling that while what is happening now in Mali is actually quite welcome news for some on the left, who are happy to use it to reinforce their anti-imperial narrative or whatever, the energies and resources now devoted to commenting on the war, might have been better used more proactively few months ago.
Of course it’s a big ‘if’, but if leftie commentators, journos and politicos had been demanding answers from the government back in the summer about how it intended to deal with what was unfolding in Mali, then it might just have hit the Cabinet agenda, and it might just have kickstarted an international process of support for regional intervention. As it was, it was December by the time ECOWAS came to a tentative agreement on use of its regional forces to support the Malian government, and by that time it was too late; French military intelligence clearly saw both that the route South was open to the jihadists, and that the jihadists had the capability and desire to take that road, and that if it didn’t strike now Bamako itself would be under threat (of course it may still be, but in a different way).
Of course the anti-war left is not responsible for what’s going on now – Cameron and co must bear some responsibility for that given that we now know how well briefed they were, or at least should have been, on the likely consequences for its southern neighbours of a changed regime in Libya.
But if the anti-war left is going to get serious about anti-imperialism/promoting the long-term advisability of stopping these continued interventions – we can be sure enough there’ll be another one along in the non-too-distant future – it had better start by getting serious about its analysis.
Cameron will be giving his big European speech this Friday, then.
In anticipation, Kev Peel at Labourlist has set out the five questions he’ll have to answer. It’s quite good. Kev’s one of the relatively small bunch of Labour insiders who’s bothered to get to grips with the detail on Europe, and it shows.
However, in assessing Cameron’s likely answer to “Exactly which powers does he wish to repatriate?”, he’s missed the possible rabbit out of the hat. Mind you, so has everyone else. Media memories are so short…….
Go back to Spring 2012, and this was aTelegraph story:
The Government is drawing up plans for emergency immigration controls to curb an influx of Greeks and other European Union residents if the euro collapses, the Home Secretary discloses today.
As I set out at the time, the mainstream response to this – that it isn’t possible to do this under European law – was plain wrong. Article 45 of the Lisbon Treaty said then, and continues to say, that there can be exceptions: to freedom of movement:
1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Union.
2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.
3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health:
(a) to accept offers of employment actually made;
(b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose;
(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance with the provisions governing the employment of nationals of that State laid down by law, regulation or administrative action;
(d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in regulations to be drawn up by the Commission.
Cameron’s team has had months now to think through the logistics on this one, and while I doubt there’ll be an announcement on its immediate of this get-out clause in the Treaty, I would n’t be at all surprised if Cameron makes an announcement about a big step forward towards its use, under the guise of repatriating powers.
Unless of course this blogpost is read by Labour policy types, and they get in ahead of the speech. Here’s hoping.
The online social enterprise community – of which I may now well be an honorary member – has had some debate about the importance or otherwise of the Secretary of State for Health’s recent definition, for the first time in English law, of what it is to be a social enterprise, which I covered here, and originally here.
David at Beanbags and Bullshit gives links and a good overview of the debate, which boils down to different views on whether the definition set out in the new Healthwatch regulations will come to act as precedent, replicated in other legislation and in broader NHS (and other departmental) policy, or whether it’s strictly focused on the very narrow, and relatively unimportant issue (given their lack of real power) of who will get to run Local Healthwatches.
To date, my own position on this has been simply “I don’t know”. On the one hand, it has been difficult to work out how exactly this new definition might be used as a lever for privatisation of NHS services. On the other, it’s a puzzle as to why the Department of Health would go to so much trouble expanding the usual conception of social enterprise to include private firms as long as they don’t take out more than 50% from profits in any one financial year, unless there was some kind of plan to expand its use beyond the financially unimportant Healthwatch scheme.
However, the news emerging about Monitor’s Fair playing Field recommendation, that private health firms should become exempt from corporation tax on their NHS profits, has me leaning a little towards the latter interpretation, namely that the Healthwatch regulations form part of some devilishly clever scheme.
I find it difficult to believe that Osborne will find it politically feasible to stand up at the next budget and announce this new tax break in the face of a popular swell against tax avoidance, however much it might be sold on the grounds that Any Qualified Provider private firms currently suffer from unfavourable cost terms when compared with the NHS itself. That would surely be too risky as a confirmation of whose side the Tories are on.
But if the tax break is dressed up as an incentive for social enterprise, tapping into the government fairly well developed narrative on the virtues of mutualism and pointing to existing ex-NHS staff mutuals as an example, but conveniently leaving out the detail of how social enteprises are legally defined nowadays, Osborne, Hunt and the private health lobbyists may well feel its worth a go as part of the pre-election scorched earth strategy.
Or maybe that’s a conspiracy theory too far. I still don’t know.
If I’m right, you heard it here first. If I’m not, then it’s simply the usual omnishambles, ok?
ps. I ‘m thinking of doing a Freedom of Information request on the consultation responses and meetings which fed into the Healthwatch regulations, to try to ascertain to what extent the private health lobbyists were at work. Has anyone else reading this done one, or are they interested in doing so?