In 1942 Kalecki said of “so called ‘economic experts'”:
Obstinate ignorance is usually a manifestation of underlying political motives (p.324)
There’s evidence of this phenomenon in George Osborne’s previewed speech to the Royal Economic Society, in which he gives a fairly reasonable explanation* of how the deflation mechanism works:
There [in the eurozone] the debate has understandably turned to the dangers of deflation – the risk of a self-reinforcing spiral where economic activity falters, consumers defer purchases* as prices fall and nominal debt burdens become ever harder to manage.
Why then, we might ask, does he not appear to understand the self-reinforcing mechanisms at work when it comes to austerity? We can, following Kalecki, assume underlying political motives for not getting that bit; ‘real’** falls in inflation are on the European mainland , not (yet) here, and anyway prices falling relative to wages is something to be celebrated in the last four months of Tory government, given the possible juxtaposition of the Bank of England having to deal with deflation in the first year of a Labour government.
In any event, a key question for a new Labour-led government is likely to be, at the very least, how do we work with our European partners to help them out of the deflationary spiral, with its negative effects on our own economy. At worst, it will be what steps need to be taken to stop our own deflationary spiral, if the Bank of England’s monetary tools prove to be ineffective.
Here, again, I think the answer may lie with Kalecki. He argues for an annual capital tax to match the government borrowing required to maintain full employment (now a rather quaint notion), so that the GDP/debt ratio falls in the context of inflation:
If full employment is maintained by Government spending financed by borrowing, the National Debt will continuously increase. This need not, however, involve any disturbances in output and employment, if interest on the Debt is financed by an annual capital tax. The current income after payment of capital tax of some capitalists will be lower and of some higher than if the National Debt had not increased, but their aggregate income will remain unaltered and their aggregate consumption will not be likely to change significantly. Further, the inducement to invest in fixed capital is not affected by a capital tax because it is paid on any type of wealth. Whether an amount is held in cash or Government securities or invested in building a factory, the same capital tax is paid on it and thus the comparative advantage is unchanged. And if investment is financed by loans it is clearly not affected by a capital tax because it does not mean an increase in wealth of the investing entrepreneur. Thus neither capitalists’ consumption nor investment is affected by the rise in he National Debt if interest on it is financed by an annual capital tax (p.323)
The key concept in Kalecki’s proposal is that capitalists can have it one of two ways. They can invest, or they can be taxed.
Either way, there’s investment. It is reasonable to assume that, in these circumstances, shareholders would look for managers good at spotting and exploiting investment opportunities, so that they get bigger dividends from big turnover, rather than just allowing tax to be levied.
That was 70 years ago, in wartime, when taxing capitalists seemed pretty reasonable. 70 years later, a direct annual tax on profit will no longer pass the political acceptability test, but their does remain an alternative which, while a somewhat different and more politically salable mechanism, might achieve the same end of persuading firms (probably those above a certain size) to spend. This could be branded a non-investment levy, whereby firms that do not invest a certain percentage of their profits become liable for a levy at or greater than that percentage. This simply switches the sequence, away from the war-time assumption that the government knows how best to invest the levy receipts in order to attain full employment, towards the more 21st century conception that firms know best where to invest, but that in a deflationary spiral it is their corporate social responsibility to do so. This may or may not be the case, but a sub-optimal strategy is better than none at all. A levy which a government can celebrate not being levied may be an attractive proposition.
The non-investment levy would need to be agreed at European level (similar to the proposed Financial Transaction Tax) in order to prevent not just relocation but also the tendency of firms to seek out imports (capital or labour) from countries where prices are falling. Thus a European levy would make sense to British interests, if Europe goes earlier and deeper into deflation. Further, tax authorities may need to establish definitions of spending which exclude those which drive up commercial and residential property prices and create even greater inequalities.
But I suspect all of this is manageable, if there is political will. Richer European countries entering deflation*** will be a scary moment which might just trigger that political will, but the solution to the problem as it then expresses itself will need to be ready and waiting at the top of the bin, or else another one will be picked out. Labour should be helping develop that solution even now.
* It’s not that good an explanation. The issue is as much firms reluctance to invest because prices will be lower later as it is consumers deferring purchases. Chris’s explanation is much better, of course
** In fact, as I showed here, Osborne’s claim that the steepness of the oil price falls are as much to with the earlier steep climb caused directly by Cameron’s disastrous foreign policy as they are by the current oversupply (from new fracking sources etc).
*** Poorer ones are already in deflation, but they don’t count politically. They would, though, back the new levy.
Readers will have seen, I think, that 17 people were shot dead last week in Paris, by gunmen associating themselves with Daech and Al Qaeida Yemen, who were also killed.
These were brutal murders. Within a few hours, though, even before four people were killed at a supermarket, the actions were being seen less as murder, and more as terrorist attacks on freedom of expression. This was because some of the people killed were journalists at a satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo.
The twitter hashtag #jesuischarlie, expressive of solidarity with the aims or ethos of the magazine, which takes some pride in its no-holds barred depiction of religion and religious figures, quickly became established, and remained at the top of twitter’s hashtag rankings until after enormous marches in France at the weekend. These marches also became gestures in support of freedom of expression. They were not primarily gestures against people being murdered.
This, I think, is a good example of the Garbage Can Model, as conceived by Cohen, March & Olsen, in action. According to the model, actors rummage around “in the garbage” for a solution which may or may not fit with the problem. In this case, the core problem – people murdered in cold blood and the possibility of more – is met with a ‘solution’ which not entirely coincidentally coincides with a media elite. As Fligstein and McAdam show, the courses of action that do get chosen are not chosen at random. They are chosen because those with material and institutional power are able to ensure that they are in the right place at the right time, unless others with less power coalesce and share resources with sufficient skill (or luck).
This reminds me a little of the debate on these pages several years ago about a thing called the Convention on Modern Liberty, in which I and my erstwhile colleague Dave took issue with purportedly radical resources being directed towards of a conference, featuring the great and the good, about the need to defend civil liberties:
For me and Dave, the liberal, metropolitan elite which soaks up human and financial resources in the name of civil liberties and ‘reform’ are, in part, responsible for the fact that since the second world war there have been no further major material advances for labour, and why over the last 30 years capital has got away with rolling back many of the concessions that labour had extracted.
Why, Dave and I would question, is it appropriate to join coalitionary force with them when they insist on seeking to undertake actions which history has proven provide for lesser material gain for labour than working class militancy?
But it also reminds me more directly of the Rotherham sex abuse scandal, in which those with sufficient influence imposed a narrative quite out of keeping with the findings of the Jay report, and insisted that the ways to stop children being sexually abused is to stop being ‘politically correct’ and start shouting at social workers. As I pointed out, in the real world what might help stop abuse is for a) social workers to be empowered to get on with their work with families, to ensure that young people feel safe at home; b) police to focus, in both their investigative and preventative roles, in a ‘race blind’ manner on what circumstances create opportunities for predators to prey on young people (takeaways, poorly regulated taxi firms, and young people who feel unsafe at home.
This, I suggested, would be a socialist response, in that it understands the dialectic of structure and agency, as well as the Overton window. It seeks to stop people being harmful agents, but it also seeks to change the structure so that being a harmful agent comes to be less and less a rational choice.
So too, a socialist response to the Paris attacks is little to do with marching for a solution to a non-problem* – does anyone really think that the two terrorists who killed journalists were motivated by insult to the prophet, rather than a desire for a dramatic display of new-found power? The real response is to look at the conditions that made these two men, angry failures, into brutal killers. The real response for socialists is to argue for the resources needed to improve the lives of all in the Parisian banlieue, so that the prospect of a good job and (male) self-respect starts to shove violent crime beyond what can be seen through the Overton window. This isn’t to deny their agency – they did what they did, while millions of French men in similar situations did not – but it is to address a problem with a solution that fits the problem.
* This is not to say the 3 million people were wrong to march, even in a march quickly co-opted by their states’ leaders for their own purpose. The march behind the leaders was one of genuine solidarity, but it is only a start, and it will be for naught if Europe’s leaders now return to type.
As the election campaign gets underway, Cameron’s record in office is coming under review, including by David Schneider and at greater length, Eoin Clarke. What surprises me a little is that neither of these pay any attention to his foreign policy record. Indeed, I’ve seen nothing for ages has any comment on the Coalition’s foreign policy (other than towards the EU) in the context of the election.
This seems a little odd, given how disastrous it’s been. I’m thinking especially of Cameron’s PR intervention in Egypt in the heady Arab Spring of 2011, followed by his orchestrating role in the Libyan war, followed again by the PR. We’ll leave aside here the effect Western intervention had on the Syrian uprising and the opportunities that opened up for the carnage and chaos we see today, as attribution is difficult to evidence however much common sense suggests a causal link, but there is little doubt that Western intervention in Libya, whatever the intentions, have led directly to the situation we see in Libya today, as well as to other instability in Mali and other Sahel states.
Of course international events get pushed to one side in a domestic election, but perhaps things would be different in this case if we looked at the direct effects on the UK economy of Cameron’s 2011 adventures. Again, precise attribution is not possible, but we can at least take a stab, with a focus on oil.
Oil prices rose steadily in the 2000s with demand growth in China, settling at around $70/barrel before a big spike to $135/barrel (Iraq and continued Chinese demand) was followed by a collapse to below $50/barrel with the financial crisis. It seems reasonable therefore to take $70/barrel as a baseline price, as it returned and steadied there or just above in the early recovery. See the chart below (source).
Prices then rose rapidly again to around $120/barrel, with this rise largely driven by the war in Libya and collapse in production/export there. It seems reasonable to attribute around 50% of that rapid rise to the Libyan war, and therefore to UK government action, on the basis that around 50% of world oil supply ‘outage’ has been because of Libyan non-productio both during the war then later as the state has collapsed (see chart):
If we do attribute 50% of the ($120-$70) $50/barrel additional price paid, we find an additional yearly cost to the UK economy of around ($25 x 500million barrels) $12.5 billion. Over, say a two period during which this attribution may be valid, then it might be argued that Cameron’s lust for foreign policy glory has cost the UK economy around $25 billion, in addition to the direct costs of waging the war (government calculations suggest about £320 million). Such a figure puts into perspective the £1.9bn Gordon Brown is argued to have traded away on gold.
Now, of course these calculations are approximate, and of course attribution can be argued up, down, or away, and I’m not arguing that they appear in election posters (I’m not convinced Labour could quite get way with that). My main point is that overt policy decision-making such as austerity may actually have less impact (as Chris notes, sub-optimal may not be a disaster at aggregate level*) than actions which results from a governing mode and from the entrenched attitudes and beliefs of the governing elite. As I argued during the Libyan war from a Bulpittian statecraft perspective, in which Cameron is a reluctant Thatcherite but natural High Tory:
Cameron and his upper-class coterie find themselves drawn towards the ‘high politics’ of Libya. This is the territory in which they feel instinctively more comfortable, and it was noticeable that Osborne in particular suddenly looks all the more at ease in TV interviews. This is not the stuff of confrontational party politics, but an arena where consensus within the Westminster village can be assumed (largely because of the trajectory of the Parliamentary Labour Party), and where they get to look statesmanlike without also having to pander to the ‘ordinary bloke’ image the electoral history of the Tory party has forced them to espouse.
Suddenly, Cameron doesn’t need to have all the details of ‘low politics’ at his fingertips; that’s beneath his new status as world leader. If the Libyan crisis had not happened, then a good deal more might have been made of his performance at PMQ’s last week, when he appeared only hazily aware of Health and Social Care Bill. But that was Wednesday. By Friday, a compliant media had no such questions, because Cameron was a statesman acting in the international interest.
We should remember, though, that this wasn’t chance. As Brian Barder has noted, there was no automatic reason for the UK to lead on the question of the No Fly Zone. It was a political choice by a Tory leader, fashioned in the upper-class mould of his predecessors……..
As I’ve said before, the New Conservative regime is involved in class war because that is in keeping with its abiding and most pervasive tradition. Its new war in Libya, however bad for the Libyans it gets, does create an opportunity to confront them on that, and to set out their ‘humanitarianism’ for the class-ridden Boys’ Own adventure that it really is.
In the end, maybe Cameron & chums’s upbringing on the playing fields of Eton is more damaging to us than the neo-liberalism that ensures those playing fields remain manicured.
* Austerity is, of course, a disaster for the vulnerable individuals and families who bear the brunt of it.
You could be forgiven for having skipped over this odd phrasing by a Conservative spokesperson at the start of today’s pre-election banter:
1.75 million more people have the security of a job……
Security of a job, rather than job security? “What’s going on here?”, I wondered, before indulging in 30 seconds primary research, which revealed that this new phrasing* appears to have been first used by Cameron in October:
If you want to provide for yourself and your family, you’ll have the security of a job but only if we stick to our long-term economic plan.
This does suggest that, rather than today’s use just being clumsy writing, the use of the variation on the phrase might actually be deliberate. And while small, it is a signifcant variation. For while “job security” is usually read not just as having a job, but having one that’s likely to last and which also gets you by, “security of a job” feels quite different in tone.
There’s more than a hint in there that the proles should have less expansive expectations about what they’re entitled too. There’s even a hint that the state accords jobs as a very part of its magnanimous welfare provision – as long as you can prove you really, really want to provide for your family by taking any old shite – rather than because that’s what the state is there for, and the proles should be grateful for that. Certainly, the sense of longevity and a link to stable household income is gone.
If I’m reading it right, the new phrase does seem to back Alex’s view that, quietly but consciously, the whole reciprocity thing, set out in the second Beveridge report – whereby the government was bound to do what it had to create full employment – has been shoved rightward beyond what we can see through the Overton window.
* I couldn’t find the phrase anywhere else except as part of a longer phrase e.g “security of a job for life”, which is clearly different in meaning.
Greece is back centre stage, with a general election on January 25th and the now quite real propect of a SYRIZA government coming to power. Tim Worstall paints an interesting scenario of what may happen next, something along these lines:
a) Greece defaults;
b) Greece is forced out of the euro;
c) Greece, in going back to the Drachma and thereby devalues and become instantly more competitive;
d) After a “pretty hairy” twelve months, Greece’s economy grows at 50-10% per year for some years;
e) Other weaker Eurozone countries – Italy, France, Belgium see this is a shortcut to prosperity, and leave the eurozone voluntarily;
f) The Eurzone effectively breaks up.
It’s an interesting scenario, but one which almost certainly won’t be played out. It won’t be played out because, while for Tim euro exit may create a “pretty hairy ” twelve months of change but be a transition well worth going through – for ordinary Greeks it will be utterly savage
This, for example, is what the National Bank of Greece (according to Bloomberg) set out back in 2012 when exit was last considered a possibility.
Per-capita income would drop by at least 55 percent in euro terms as a new currency would depreciate by about 65 percent, according to the report, emailed from the bank today. The recession would deepen by about 22 percent at stable prices, adding to the 14 percent recorded in the 2009 to 2011 period, National said, while unemployment would jump to 34 percent and inflation rise to above 30 percent, pushed up by the higher cost of imported goods.
Nor would the effects of exit simply be short-term pain for long-term gain. Exit would also massively increase inequalities. As I said in 2012:
While it’s impossible to say exactly how leaving the Eurozone might pan out, these will be among the consequences*:
- Within a day of the creation and flotation of the New Drachma….. its value will crash against ‘hard’ currencies, and the purchasing power of Greeks for anything imported will be slashed. It’s impossible to know by how much, but a cut of 75% purchasing power is certainly not out of the question [I wrote this two weeks before the National Bank predicted 55%];
- In an internationalized economy like Greece, there is no such thing as ‘out of the euro’. Most rich Greeks able to do so will already have stored their wealth elsewhere and the capital flight will continue to happen. The idea of proper capital controls is frankly fanciful. As holders of still-valid euros, or other ‘hard’ currencies, they will then be in position to purchase both the assets and labour of the mass majority of increasingly desperate Greeks at rock-bottom rates.
- A dual economy will swiftly emerge, as in pretty well all countries without their own hard currencies. This will further deepen inequalities in daily life, potentially even with usual services and products only available to those with access to hard currency, as will the emergence of black market currency trading, where the New Drachma is even less valuable than at the official exchange rate.
Greeks know this, and so does SYRIZA. That is why, while 74.2% of Greeks surveyed believe that Greece should remain in the euro “at all costs”, they also give a 3.1% poll lead to SYRIZA. They knowthat, even if Germany were in a position to push Greece out if it defaulted (and that is doubtful), SYRZIA would be committing political suicide by allowing an exit – whether on purpose or through over-bullish endgame negotiation forcing the Troika into a political face save at the expense of economic sense.
Euro exit is simply not an option for SYRIZA (it has never said that it is), and there is no conundrum (whatever Olaf thinks) for Greek voters over whether to vote against austerity and for exit or for austerity and against it; SYRIZA offers a much better chance of getting the best of both worlds than it did in 2012, and that’s why they stand a better chance of winning this time.
Yes, SYRIZA will bargain hard from a position of strong democratic mandate, but they will bargain, as will the Troika, and a compromise will be reached (possibly including direct fiscal transfer via Structural Funds in return for higher debt payments as facesaver for the Troika).
And even if the worst did come to pass, and disastrous negotiation tactics/styles from both sides did lead to an exit, the economic and social carnage on the streets of Greece would soon put Italy off from following the same path.
So while according to Tim’s classical theory the comparative advantages of real devaluation over internal devaluation may make some sense on paper (if you ignore equality issues), don’t expect to see the theory tested any time soon. Macro often doesn’t meet real life.
As I’ve only taken up blogging and blog-reading again in the last couple of days, I hope I’ll be forgiven for singling out this article The Great Moving Left Show: Making it Happen, over at Left Futures as being typical of the online Left’s current hopelessness.
It’s a 500 worder (ish), and makes the following basic argument:
a) People don’t like austerity;
b) Austerity has been imposed because of the the prior imposition of a neoliberal narrative;
c) Labour is useless on austerity;
d) “[T]he political class at Westminster is in disarray and there is potential for a progressive alternative.”
None of this is wrong exactly, though I think Labour is less wrong on austerity than they are actually (deliberately) making it out, but it really doesn’t take us anywhere. Indeed, if the Trades Description Act 1968 covered blogs, I think there’d be a strong case for the prosecution about a blog sub-titled “making it happen” which devotes just half a sentence about “potential for a progressive alternative” to that matter.
So how do we actually get somewhere? I’ll be writing a lot about this this year (partly updating and expanding on my very naive attempts from a few years ago now that I’m about 1,000% better read/considered) but here are two suggested starting points for the intellectual work (including that of more serious bloggers) which will be needed to catalyze a genuine shift to the left of the Overton window:
First, we need to get more specific and, dare I say, radical, about what we’re looking for. Chris, as ever, makes a pretty good start albeit in questioning form:
Any serious revolution would, of course, disempower political and business elites and empower people. Which raises many questions: why is there so little popular demand for worker management or even direct democracy? How do we promote anti-managerialism? Could we achieve worker democracy without weakening incentives to innovate? What institutions do we need to create a healthy deliberative democracy rather than debased populism?
Focusing around this kind of question will be a huge step forward from the now outdated “How do we beat austerity?” question, which pre-supposes that a return to a 2008-style welfare state would be a victory. Doesn’t anyone remember how managerially corroded that welfare state had become by 2008?
Second, we need to develop a firm grasp of the mechanisms of successful collective social action, and start to consciously apply them, moving beyond the platitudinous certainties of, on the one hand, the part of the Left which continues to argue for one last push/fight/demo, despite the repeat-ad-tedium failure of these same tactics to effect change (on their own), and on the other the “community organisation” tactics of part of the Labour party, which often amount to little more than the political version of Which magazine.
Here, a decent starting point might be the work of Fligstein of McAdam, who call for a drawing together of findings from social movement theory & research and from political science, especially around the central idea of the Strategic Action Field, within which successful actors (and thereby movements) are those that best draw in and share resources with others who have mutually realisable interests, and who develop the skills needed to make the most of opportunities provided by both internal shift and exogenous shocks (they take the success of the civil rights movement in the US as a key case study).
This is not the only necessarily field of study, of course; much could also be learned from Paul Hirst’s and others early (all-too-forgotten) thinker’s and activists’ work around associative democracy, and especially about how new associations might develop into institutions which can claim parallel legitimacy to those of an overbearing state (I think for example, of the Scottish Trade Union Council’s Inquiry as the clinching feature of the 1971-72 Upper Clyde Shipbuilder Work-in).
But I particular favour development work around proper ‘coalition’ building (including Overton window creation, of course) in light of the marked failure of the left on the 2010-2012 period to form any useful form of ‘strategic action field’ comprising, say, the Occupy movement and the mainstream labour movement (indeed the two movements’ expressed interests seemed to move further apart, not closer).
Who should lead on this work? Well, the trade union think-tank Centre for Labour & Social Studies (CLASS) might be a good place to generate initial resources, if it could get beyond its current narrow and defensive focus and start to look seriously about what can be created through a coherent approach to the seizure of power.
I am also, I hasten to add, available. I’m also quite cheap (though wage-led growth will need to include me too).
Chris Cook, one of the few centrist media people worth taking seriously – largely because he is open to new ideas and data – tweets surprise at a Neal Lawson column, in which the latter suggests that New Labour’s key failure was its success in getting votes from the rich.
I well remember crunching my way up gravel drives past BMWs in Enfield the day Stephen Twigg ousted Michael Portillo – oh, how we cheered later that morning. But in hindsight the wrong people were voting Labour. The tent was too big and you spent the next 10 years trying to keep the wrong people in it: the very rich, for example. What meaningful project includes everyone?
And I’m surprised at Chris’s surprise. Has politics really become a PR exercise to the extent that for even one of the better commentators, the idea of different material interests, served by different political parties, seems ridiculous?
This is not to say that Lawson is entirely correct in his equating Enfield gravel-pathed residence and BMW ownership with a set of interests that only the Conservative party can meet. Many of those people had very valid reason to vote Labour in 1997, given the manifesto promises made (and quite well fulfilled) around state education, just for example. For myself, I prefer the Tory/Labour constituency dividing lines drawn up 80-odd years ago by RH Tawney, who argues convincingly for the inclusion of “brain workers” in the development of socialist democracy oriented towards socially useful work, while the capitalist owner of the means of production can only ever be on the other side of the political gain line.
But Lawson is right to say that when a political tent is too big, too inclusive, then political direction can be (and was) lost, not least because it is the very visibility (and openness to metaphoric description) of opposing interests which helps maintain that direction (cf. UKIP’s progress in relation to visible immigration).
Indeed, the principle of material interests in political opposition to each other has to be accepted if the votes of, let us say, the self-employed and small business owners, are to be properly contested by one the one hand, a Tory party claiming them in the spirit of capitalism (without the capital for the greater part), and a Labour party which can and should argue that in the early 21st century self-employment is often imposed, and that many small business owners actually manage* – sometimes heroically – to operate within a cut-throat supply chain environment while still maintaining a viable moral economy in relation to their employees and clients.
Those votes are worth fighting for and actually, yes, they may be better votes than ones from the very rich.
* There’ll be more on this in coming posts, especially around how legal structure has become more important in policy than the reality of work norms, not least as I count myself as one of these small business owners, although one without too much need for heroics.