Today it looks like UKIP is on the rise, and may have broken through. Very bad news. At times like this, Kafka is need.
Kafka as Freudian?
There are about as many interpretations of Kafka’s work as numbers of doors I’ve knocked on in the last few months. Lots.
There are some I don’t buy – it’s all just a straight condemnation of early 20thcentury bureaucracy because he had to work hard in a dull office, for example.
And at least until recently, I wasn’t convinced by wholly psychoanalytic explanations, though it was fairly obvious that Kafka had a grasp of Freudian concepts of the ego/id.
The more I re-read (and have learned German) though, the more convincing I find the Kafka-as-Freudian interpretation. Certainly, the text is littered with what we might now call Freudian slips, where the unconscious (or ‘id’) peeps through the surface of the page.
This is facilitated by his regular use of the literary device of ‘erlebte Rede’ (‘experienced speech’) or indirect free speech, which collapses first and third person narrative; and indeed there is some evidence that Kafka was studious in the way he edited his work to create this effect.
The notion that central to Kafka’s work is the tension between the ego and the id (in modern society), and that alienation, despair and death comes from the suppression of the id at the expense of the ego, is straightforward enough to sustain. Just look at the way Kafka’s characters die for that evidence. K (The Trial) dies ‘as though the shame were meant to outlive him’ because he never accepts his guilt – he never accepts that he is guilty of the suppression of his unconscious desires, instead indulging ever more convoluted rationalisations in a doomed bid to seek to win out over what must remain irrational because it is of the subconscious.
Gregor (Metamorphosis), on the other hand, dies happy (and his family goes out into the light for the first time in months) because he becomes accepting of the animal he is. When does Gregor being to move towards a happy death? When his sister plays the violin – music transcends – and when he starts to accept that he is an animal (his id) rather than struggle against it.
And why does the officer in the penal colony willingly choose death through what to the explorer seems like (pre-modern) savagery, and yet still not get ‘redemption’ on his face as he dies?
And of course The Castle ends with death in defeat, but reconciliation with defeat by what-is-irrational.
Kafka as postmodernist?
But that is not all there is to Kafka, not by a country doctor’s mile.
While Kafka’s work is ‘timeless’ – a message about needing to be true to yourself – such a relatively straightfoward interpretation risks leaving out from it a load of the words he actually wrote, especially about women.
To deal with this we need to set his work back into its historic context of a new modernity/bureacuracy which was, for Kafka, heightening that level of alienation, through the rise of an early capitalist consumerist society.
Ultimately, Kafka does not just question how people’s minds work within a social context, but also how ‘real’ that social context is in the first place.
In this respect he presages much of postmodern philosophical thought, and is the reason he is relevant to the Left. Indeed I would argue that he is more relevant in the early 21st century than when leading thinkers in the left – notably Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin – sought to claim him as one of our own some fifty years ago.
A useful starting for that interpretative journey, from an interpretation of Kafka as writer that just ‘messes with your Freudian head’ to one of Kafka as someone who has profoundly important things to say to us a century later is Jacques Lacan’s Marxian re-interpretation of Freud, who (as I’ve suggested) may have been at least an indirect influence on Kafka.
Lacanian psychoanalysis is notoriously difficult to understand – indeed there are those who suggest that Lacan wrote impenetrably because he was, in the end, talking pure bollocks, whether or not in a knowingly ironic manner.
I don’t side with this argument, but I am happy to acknowledge that his primary texts are simply too hard for me and my small-size brain to handle, and I need to turn to intermediaries to get what he’s on about.
Fortunately, when there’s Slajov Zizek around to write a ‘How to Read’ book on Jacques Lacan, you’re in pretty safe hands.
So, what happens if you take a Lacanian approach to the text of The Trial, for example?
What happens is that, suddenly, the apparent irrationality of the Law starts to look like the inherent irrationality of the ‘desiring agency’ of Lacanian psychoanalysis. That is to say, the law is all-that-is-desire, and in Lacanian terms the Marxian dialectic of structure and agency, the essential incompatibility of which creates the alienation of the individual, is collapsed into a permanence of alienation, because ‘the law’ controls both K’s desire and that which is desired.
This ties into later elaborations in Lacan, in which he expands upon the Marxist concept of surplus value to include what he terms ‘jouissance’ (or enjoyment). Similar to the notion of surplus value, Lacan holds that any social enjoyment we get through work, leisure, consumption, sex etc. comes a at cost, and is mediated through some bureaucratic agency, and intensified through the subject’s own compulsion to enjoy. This enjoyment can never be fully realised because it is mediated through these agencies, which ‘skim’ off ever greater surpluses, leaving only enough enjoyment to engender further (obsessive) compulsions, to further consume and enjoy.
And so it in The Trial. It’s as if the Law operates both as the site of obscene enjoyment (the magistrates’ books are full of porn, the couple have sex at the back of the examination room), and as the agency compelling K to enjoy while also forcing its prohibitions (the student working for the court carries off the washer woman whom K was trying to seduce).
The relationship between women and K, and between K and the Law, is central to the book.
The Law is a wholly unknowable entity, from which things emerge/disappear but no answers can be given. K receives no answer from the Law as it has none to give him.
What, then, does desire (the Law?) want? It wants K to keep on desiring, which is why the Law in the book permits an unlimited postponement maintaining desire until death, and even beyond, as the shame of (unfulifilled) desire goes with K to the grave. In short, Kafka expresses, in poetic form and fifty years ahead of his time a post-Marxist analysis of what it is to be alienated’.
(In passing, I think there’s a parallel here with Milan Kundera’s ‘treatment’ of women in the Unbearable Lightness of Being, where the skimming of the surplus value related to sexual enjoyment actually declines as the main protagonist Tomášstrives towards some form of revolutionary consciousness).
But this is not where it stops – if Kafka were simply a very early Freudian-Lacanian psychoanlayst, and an emergent post-Marxist, it would be impressive, and Kakfa’s work would still be captivating. But it would hardly be something for the Left to hold on to now, as an important influence (and consoltation) for the hard times that we now face.
Kafka as post-liberal socialist
For me, the pinnacle of Kafka’s intellectual outpouring is NOT the Trial, though it may be the most perfect work in terms of how it entwines form and meaning (though I’d argue that Metamorphosis and The Castle are both up there).
For me, the pinnacle is the last (unfinished) novel, Amerika (alternative titles are available as he didn’t give it one).
Amerika is the oft overlooked third big novel, ‘the lighthearted one’ which doesn’t really fit with the other two. What Amerika is, though, is a step forward in Kafka’s ‘postmodern’ vision, and one which takes us beyond Lacan to the harder edged, but ultimately more liberating social theory of Baudrillard (at least in his last work, The Intelligence of Evil: The Lucidity Pact).
Baudrillard is of course most famous (and mostly pilloried) for his concept of a late capitalist society which has become a totalising ‘virtual reality’ (‘The Gulf war did not take place’), a world in which consumer overload means there is no longer even any potential for the kind of ’alienation’ that the left has hitherto set out as an inevitablity of the surplus value-based system of capitalism. This is because the concept of alienation in itself proposes some form of residual reality, however unattainable, or in Marxist terms, however far from the consciousness of the proletariat..
It is possible to conceive of the Trial, and The Castle, as just such ‘realities’, from which only knowledge in death can release us (and I’m sure David Bowie had been reading Kafka rather than early Baudrillard when he penned Quicksand on Hunky Dory).
But Amerika provides the resolution to the philosophical impasse, just as The Lucidity Pact does so about a century later.
Essentially, the setting of Amerika IS a virtual reality. It is no longer the near but never totalising (consciousness-excluding) universes of The Trial or The Castle, where desire is unfulfilled and the end must be death and/or shame, depending on the level of guilt acceptance; instead it is a complete world, where things seem as they are because what is written of them is based on photographic representations and travel guides – the early 20th century equivalent of the television travel programme, in which you enjoy a virtual holiday without having to leave your armchair).
But, as with Baudrillard’s Lucidity Pact, there is a liberation even within the acknowledgment that there is no escape.
It is no coincidence that Rossmann, the central character, joins a theatre – the epitome of artificial representation – and that this seems to be the key to his ultimate happiness (albeit in an unfinished novel).
Moreover, it is no coincidence that, at the end of the novel, Rossmann chooses to take a technical position (notably returning to a childhood daydream) instead of an acting position in the theatre. He is at once accommodating himself to the fact that the theatre is the best place for him, and taking satisfaction that he is able to see it at one (small) step’s remove. Importantly for the process of reclaiming Kafka for the Left, it is through engagement and solidarity with his fellow workers (how different to K, who seeks to dominate) – workers who are a disparate bunch but who get on fine, despite different language backgrounds – that Rossmann nears contentment.
The way Kafka set out this contentment brings us full circle to Kafka’s early short story Metamorphosis; the final (unfinished) passage has the train with the theatre on board moving out into the vastness of the nature of America, similar to, but on a vaster scale, than the walk in the springtime that Gregor’s family take after his death in Metamorphosis.. Here, it seems, is a poetic resolution of how to live (even in the literal sense) with the fact that all is unreal, unknowable and alienating.
Which is precisely what Baudrillard is up to in the Lucidity Pact:
At bottom…..we are faced with an alternative: either we suppose a real that is entirely permeable to history (to meaning, to the idea, to interpretation, to decision) and we ideologize or, by contrast, we suppose a real that is ultimately impenetrable and irreducible and in that case we poetize. (p. 63).
Baudrillard, then, seeks out – as an explicitly political project – an ‘otherness’ of thinking, as a means to create a strained but workable compromise-with-virtuality by which we might live.
Kafka, it seems to me, goes one stage further in his explicitly political ending to Amerika – it is is through communication and solidarity with other human beings that we actually manage to accommodate ourselves to this ‘otherness’. And here, strange though it may seem, I think both Kakfa and Baudrillard meet Jurgen Habermas and his chunky Theory of Communcative Action coming the other way.
Habermas gets there by a completely different route – rejecting from the off what he considered to be the innate conservatism of poststructuralist/modernist relativity in favour of an appeal to ‘ideal speech’ as the foundation for a new call to universal and interpersonal values.
But in the end, it seems to me, Baudrillard and Habermas are united in the view that, while the ‘soul searching’ of the past fifty years of postmodernist philosophical development may have been necessary and worthwhile, it has also been regressive in terms of commitment to action, and that it’s time to move on with a renewed commitment to a clarity of (political) communication – whether that be as a result of some filthy pact with devilish virtuality, or because the values of the enlightenment has been rekindled.
And what, ultimately, is communication in the context of universal values?
Ultimately, I’d argue that the only real difference between the political philosophy journeys of Baudrillard/Habermas and Kafka is that Kafka travelled the road in a few short tuberculous-ridden years in the early 20th century, and used a lot less words to get there.
And for that reason alone, Kafka is worth reclaiming by the Left for what he is – not the Czech ‘enigma’, or the troubled genius, but a genius political philosopher a hundred years ahead of his time. As I’ve noted, there have been plenty of attempts to claim Kafka as one of our own (Adorno, Arendt), and more recently Michael Lowy has sought to identify Kafka’s ‘libertarian socialist’ leanings.
Sinead Kennedy also had a pretty good stab at it, analysing from ‘the hard left’ how Kafka was given a pretty rough ride by Stalin and his not-very-good-at-philosophy-or-art mates, but how he makes a lot of sense to the Left.
I contend that Kafka makes more than a lot of sense.
I contend that he should be regarded as a leading intellectual light of the Left, a key weapon in the intellectual armoury of the Left as it seeks to combat the thirty-year philosophical hegemony of the New Right, and in its wake, the rise of a nastier ‘post-liberalism’ swiftly shedding any remaining enlightenment principle, which in turn, at least in central Europe, is already giving way to something even darker.
The Secular Respectable Left
‘Why on earth do some left-wingers side with Islamists, when Islamists are so evil?’ is an on-going question-cum-accusation, levelled at people like Nick Cohen at people like…….well, people like me.
Thus Nick Cohen in the Spectator, suggests the way the ‘classic’ British left side with the Islamist establishment means they are simply racists:
Other speakers [at the launch of the Centre for Secular Space] were from Southall Black Sisters, Bengali secular campaigns against Tower Hamlets’ Islamist establishment and Iranian resistance groups – classic left wing figures, in other words. Yet they are ignored or in the case of Sahgal fired for speaking out.
All emphasized how many in the British state and British left were racists hiding behind liberal masks. On the left, the racism came in the constant postponement of campaigns to improve women’s lives whether they are immigrants or in the poor world. Their suffering must always be subordinated to the struggle against ‘American imperialism’. This would be bad enough if we did not see from the far Left way into the liberal mainstream supposed progressives allying with clerical reactionaries and clerical fascists. They ignore the victims of theocracy and accept their oppression.
Similarly, Carl Packman at Left Foot Forward, blames the far-left for mix of political immaturity and ‘paternalism’:
And here is where the far-left and the British and American establishment can find harmony. While the latter needs the Muslim far-right in Saudi Arabia for cash, they keep quiet about human rights abuses. For the far-left the comradeship is just as dubious, if not slightly more immature.
Recently I was at the launch of a new book by Trotskyist writer and blogger Richard Seymour, who told a packed audience in Kings Cross that the Stop the War Coalition did not wish to pursue sectarianism, deciding who should and should not be marching against the war, but in any case those religious right-wingers might have had their minds changed through a union with the left……..
If this isn’t paternalist (Muslim beliefs, whatever they are, are only temporary, easily overturned), I don’t know what is.
In the end, goes the core argument of the Cohen/Packman/Harry’s Place nexus, the far left/lefties/liberals  are the real right-wingers here, and they either need to change their ways or shut up, while the Secular Responsible Left (my coinage, get used to it) get on with the real job in hand of promoting human rights.
For myself, I think this analysis is at least as ’immature’ as the politics it professes to critique. The suggestion that someone like Richard Seymour (he being a useful cipher for the broad doctrine of the leftist groupings around the SWP/Stop the War), is some kind of closet racist/paternalist, and that he’s “in harmony” with the British and American establishment, is frankly just silly . Such an analysis fundamentally confuses agency with structure, and in the absence of any coherent analysis of why some on the far left/liberal left do seem to get aligned with reactionary Islam, the Secular Responsible Left falls back on the idea that, ultimately, they’re all just bad, wrong people.
In this two part article, I argue that such an approach is not simply politically immature in terms of its failure to distinguish structure from agency. I argue that is also deeply unhelpful as a political strategy for anyone really, really interested in a progressive socialism inclusive of human rights guarantees and the emancipation of the oppressed (and there can be no progressive socialism without that). In the end, accusations levelled at Seymour by Packman look and feel like sectarian squabbling getting in the away of constructive organisation, largely because that is what they are: ‘my integrity is bigger than yours’ political willy-waving fests may fill small halls of the like-minded, but they are not going to change the lives of marginalised women anytime soon.
Indeed the Secular Respectable Left is, I will argue (following John Gray p.125-6), more reactionary, more unhelpful to the cause of emancipation that they profess to espouse than are the far/liberal/mainstream left at whom they throw this same accusation.
Habermas and value pluralism
So what is a more ‘mature’ analysis of how some on the Left come, apparently, to side with the anti-human rights baddies against the goodies?
A good place to start is with the work Jurgen Habermas, who has devoted a large part of his career, from the early 1990s onwards, to resolving the tension that lies at the heart of the current debate: how do modern constitutional democracies best promote respect both for individual human rights and for the rights of groups of people to live by different cultural values (what has been termed the “struggle for recognition“), when such cultural values sometimes are so opposed to a liberal conception of human rights (and vice versa)? It is a resolution to this dilemma – itself a result of the multi-ethnic world that has developed through the 20th century – which forms Habermas’ whole ‘constitutional patriotism’ project, seeking to replace the comfortable majoritarian certainties of ethno-nationalist value consensus (comfortable for those who are included) with a newer commitment to a political culture which accommodates (and in time are, through discourse, adaptable to) different cultures and their value sets .
In Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights (ch, 5 in Postnational Constellations: Political Essays) Habermas gets to the core:
The human rights discourse that has been argued on normative terms is plagued by the fundamental doubt about whether the form of legitimation that has arisen in the West can also hold up as plausible within the framework of other cultures. The most radical critics are Western intellectuals themselves. They maintain that the universal validity claimed for human rights merely hides a perfidious claim to power on the part of the West.
This is no accident. To gain some distance from one’s traditions and limited perspectives in one of the advantages of occidental rationalism. The European history of the interpretation of human rights is the history of such a decentring of out way of viewing things. So-called equal rights may have only been gradually extended to oppressed, marginalized, and excluded groups. Only after tough political struggles have workers, women, Jews, Romanies, gays and political refugees been recognized as “human beings” with a claim to fully equal treatment. The important thing now is that the individual advances in emancipation reveal in hindsight the ideological function that human rights had also fulfilled up to that time. That is, the egalitarian claim to universal validity and inclusion had also served to mask the de facto unequal treatment of those who were silently excluded. This observation has aroused the suspicion that human rights might be reducible to this ideological unction. Have they not always served to shield a false universality – an imaginary humanity, behind which an imperialist West could conceal its own way and interests (p.119-120).
It is this disjuncture between the rhetoric of universality and the practice of exclusion as the key means to establish and expand empire which is so meticulously detailed in Domenico Losurdo’s recent Liberalism: A Counter-History. And it is Habermas’ understanding of this ‘dialectic between subjugation and emancipation’ which provides for his key insight; this is to pick out both the negative and positive features of “occidental rationalism”: a tendency to ascribe any form of enduring inequality and exploitation to imperialism, which can hinder empirical analysis, balanced by a genuine openness other value sets.
The less respectable Left’s (Althusserian) engagement with value pluralism
This is precisely the situation in which some on the British left do now find themselves.
On the one hand, because the left positions itself primarily in opposition to the logic of imperialism (rooted, as Losurdo has set out so clearly, in the exclusionary tendencies of liberalism), it tends to see all events through this lens. Thus, as I set out in my recent anti-war left essay, the empirical evidence that some Western military intervention is not in fact motivated by a rapacious need for natural resources is discounted in favour of a narrative of post-colonial imperialism. In this narrative, the maxim that ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’ takes strong hold, and the tendency is simply to take the side of any group which also sets itself in opposition to the forces of Western imperialism 
On the other hand, there is the ‘positive’ dynamic, reflecting the other side of the coin of Habermas’ insight. This is that left-wing intellectuals of the Richard Seymour type appear to be genuinely motivated by their (Marxist) occidental rationalism to recognise that there are other ways of looking at rights than through the prism of liberalism.
In this reading, what the Secular Respectable Left see as a betrayal of liberal values and human rights can be seen simply as an acknowledgment by some on the left that there are other worldviews, which do not depend on the primacy of the individual, which are potentially as valid.
Take, for example two interpretations of this Harry’s Place article. ‘Lucy Lips’ attacks those she descibes the far left “anti-racists” (her inverted commas) for working with the East London Mosque, who in turn have hosted “Islamist preacher” Khaild Al-Fikri. As evidence, of the far left’s wrongness in its engagement, she quotes Al-Fikri from a previous conference:
Don’t be misleaded [sic] and misguided with those kaffir people who says it is freedom and you are a free man. They are kuffar. And when they say, and poison your mind with the word freedom, they mean there is no God. “Do whatever you want.” Because they are kuffar. … You need to protect your deen [religion] and iman [faith] because there are many things which will affect you, will come against you. Somebody will say to you “democracy, socialism, freedom”………And again for my sisters. Don’t be misguided. Don’t be misleaded [sic] by the kaffir theories and attitudes. You are very free when you are home with your husband and your kids. … Don’t say “I am a free woman, I want to run house, I want to work, I want to get money”. No! This is the duty of your husband.
Now, to my eyes, and to the eyes of most people reading this piece, this is pretty unpleasant reactionary stuff, at least at first reading. But stand back for a minute, strip away the insulting ‘kuffar’ term, and what you’re left with is little more than an expression of what Habermas has suggested: that the concept of ‘freedom’ is some kind of trap; that it is a Western invention aimed at diverting people from the true path of the divine; that Muslims should retain their own core ethical standards, even if they have to defend them against corrupt Western ones. Certainly, it’s arguable that the guidance on the role of women expressed here is, as Saeeda Shah has noted, an expression, of Islamic philosophy “misappropriated by those who have traditionally occupied the spaces of religious interpretation” (p.245), but notwithstanding the question of who, within a community, gets to establish community’s values and notms (and this is something I come back to in part 2), it still possible to recognise it as a valid expression of a particular ethical standpoint. And this, remember, is from someone widely considered so “extremist” that even to meet with a group which has previously invited him to speak under their roof is an indication of betrayal of all decency.
By way of comparison, here’s self-confessed American liberal Jonathan Haidt, talking about the period spent in Orissa (albeit a period I suspect is conveniently reconstructed for his arguments) during which he realised that the concept of freedom and rights might not have singular validity:
I had read about Shewder’s ethic of community and had understood it intellectually. But now, for the first time in my life, I began to feel it. I could feel beauty in a moral code that emphasizes beauty, respect for one’s elders, service to the group, and negation of the self’s desires. I could still see its ugly side: I could see that power sometimes leads to pomposity and abuse. And I could see that subordinates – particularly women – were often blocked from doing what they wanted to do by the whims of their elders (male and female). but for the first time in my life, i was able to step outside my home morality, the ethic of autonomy. I had a place to stand, and from the vantages point of the ethic of community, the ethic of autonomy now seemed overly individualistic and self-focused (p.102).
Haidt’s recognition that different societies might have equally valid moral bases for the way in which their members lives their lives (whilst also recognising that who holds power is a key determinant) is not new. Indeed, Haidt quotes anthropologist Clifford Geertz approvingly:
The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively against other such wholes and against is social and natural background, is, however incorrigible it may seem to us. a rather peculiar idea within the contexts of the world’s cultures (p.126, quoted at p.14 in Haidt)
The challenge that Haidt and Geertz set themselves , as academics raised within the Western liberal tradition, is to put aside their preconception about what is morally correct, and embrace ‘value pluralism’. And this, it seems to me, is what those on the Left now prepared to engage with radical Islam are also trying to do. True, they don’t articulate it very well, preferring to explain any such engagement as anti-imperialist agitation rather than as a recognition that different worldviews, however alien to our own, have a validity for the simple reason that people have them . Perhaps I even overestimate here the intelligence of some on the far left, though perhaps such a reliance on ‘tried and tested’ anti-imperialism narrative is understandable in the context of a media (including Harry’s Place) keen to misrepresent a call for the understanding of Islamic values as direct support for extremism.
Whatever the motivations, articulated or otherwise, of those on the Left prepared to deal with value pluralism, the important point is that only those on the (far) Left are prepared to engage with probably the most serious question of our times. That question is:
How, in a world in which capitalism has become the almost universal economic modus vivendi, and liberal values have underpinned the rise of capitalism, do we now best deal with the ‘struggle for recognition’ of a very different value set, in a way which both respects value pluralism but also pay proper heed to the emancipatory ideal that lies at the heart of what it is to be left-wing (whether this be Marxist or rooted in earlier Enlightenment thinking)?
Answering that question, again with reference to Habermas, is the task of part 2 of this article (coming soon). In the meantime, it’s worth noting (h/t @sunny_hundal) that attempts to reach out across the value-divide towards some form of long-term political/constiutional settlement, are not necessarily taking place in one direction only. No doubt the Islamic Society of Denmark are getting their version of Harry’s Place-style accusations of treachery from the Unsecular Respectable Islamists, but I applaud them as I applaud the efforts of those on the Left who are seeking some way forward, even while hampered by their Althusserian (see ) anti-imperialist ritual.
 Cohen in particular seems to use these terms interchangeably.
 In the accusation that the far/liberal left are operating in ‘harmony’ with the Western establishment, Packman finds himself in interesting company. Here’s revolutionary Marxist Samir Amin, the consternation of Alex Callinicos of the SWP, coming out in support of French intervetion in Mali, on the basis of an interesting argument that “reactionary political Islam” is in reality a support, rather than a threat, to Western imperialism, because its presence allows the imperialist powers to maintain their control over the people of the ‘triad’ (the US, Europe and Japan) in the name of a ‘war of the civilisations’.
Telle est la raison fondamentale pour laquelle les puissances de la triade – telles qu’elles sont et demeurent – y voient un allié stratégique. Le soutien systématique apporté par ces puissances à l’Islam politique réactionnaire a été et demeure l’une des raisons majeures des « succès » qu’il a enregistrés : les Talibans d’Afghanistan, le FIS en Algérie, les « Islamistes » en Somalie et au Soudan, ceux de Turquie, d’Egypte, de Tunisie et d’ailleurs ont tous bénéficié de ce soutien à un moment décisif pour leur saisie du pouvoir local. Aucune des composantes dites modérés de l’Islam politique ne s’est jamais dissociée véritablement des auteurs d’actes terroristes de leurs composantes dites « salafistes ». Ils ont tous bénéficié et continuent à bénéficier de « l’exil » dans les pays du Golfe, lorsque nécessaire. En Libye hier, en Syrie encore aujourd’hui ils continuent à être soutenus par ces mêmes puissances de la triade. En même temps les exactions et les crimes qu’ils commettent sont parfaitement intégrés dans le discours d’accompagnement de la stratégie fondée sur leur soutien : ils permettent de donner de la crédibilité à la thèse d’une « guerre des civilisations » qui facilite le ralliement « consensuel » des peuples de la triade au projet global du capital des monopoles. Les deux discours – la démocratie et la guerre au terrorisme – se complètent mutuellement dans cette stratégie.
For myself, I don’t buy the argument that, just because one political or ideological grouping does or says something than can be argued to be favourable to the interests of another grouping, that both these groupings must therefore have a common purpose.
 Casting Habermas’ sophisticated argument as simply as possible, constitutional patriotism acknowledges that in modern culturally plural societies the ethno-nationalism that used to bind people to a shared identity and thereby create the conditions for the legitimacy of the democratic state. That is, the two key underpinnings of the modern state form as developed in the 18th century – a national identity allied with a republican ideal of individual citizen operating in voluntary contract with each other to abide by the laws of the state – have become less firmly connected. Habermas’ believes that the 21st century state must find a new “functional equivalent for the fusion of the nation of citizens with the ethnic nation”, and that to do this we need to create a patriotic commitment to a legal and political constitution, however abstract, while allowing diverse cultures to flourish in their own terms. I’ll come back to this in part 2. For more, see Andrea Baumeister’s essay Diversity and Unity: The Problem with ‘Constitutional Patriotism’ for an intelligent critique.
 It strikes me that this tendency on the part of the Left to push aside any evidence that does not fit with the narrative of resource-hungry imperialism is, ironically, a good example of Althusserian interpellation. As Althusser says:
The individual in question behaves in such and such a way, adopts such and such a practical attitude, and, what is more, participates in certain regular practices which are those of the ideological apparatus on which ‘depend’ the ideas which he has in all consciousness freely chosen as a subject. If he believes in God, he goes to Church to attend Mass, kneels, prays, confesses, does penance (once it was material in the ordinary sense of the term) and naturally repents and so on. If he believes in Duty, he will have the corresponding attitudes, inscribed in ritual practices ‘according to the correct principles’. If he believes in Justice, he will submit unconditionally to the rules of the Law, and may even protest when they are violated, sign petitions, take part in a demonstration, etc.
To this set of beliefs, we might perhaps add ‘Marxism’, in which name a large number of ritual practices have also been established. I would argue that, for many Marxists, who enter into that doctrine of their own free will, the act of interpellation is a strong one, with Marx(ism) maintaining all the key features of the (capital S) Subject. I wonder, indeed, whether it is this process of interpellation, and the commitment to ritual, which lies at the heart of the troubles both the SWP and the Catholic Church now face:
Were not men made in the image of God? As all theological reflection proves, whereas He ‘could’ perfectly well have done without men, God needs them, the Subject needs the subjects, just as men need God, the subjects need the Subject. Better: God needs men, the great Subject needs subjects, even in the terrible inversion of his image in them (when the subjects wallow in debauchery, i.e. sin).
 It’s worth noting here that openness to value pluralism is not a particular new concept at all. An awareness of the tension between universality and pluralism can be traced back at least as far as Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. Smith, as an early liberal not caught up by the imperative felt by later liberals like JS Mill to justify imperialist expansion (on which see Jennifer Pitts), was not able to resolve these tensions, but the very fact that he – two centuries before Habermas was aware of them suggests that it continues to be an area still worthy of consideration. As Samuel Fleischacker has noted, in an interesting essay which argues that modern political philosophy might benefit from Smith’s implicitly anthropological approach:
Smith is unlikely to offer us any straightforward meta-ethical reconciliation between relativism and absolutism, and his promising hints about how, in ethics proper, to bring together pluralism and universalism, are undermined, to some degree, by his meta-ethical dilemma. But the problems he faces in these regards are our problems too, and thinking with Smith may help nudge us toward a solution to them, even if that solution is not explicitly to be found in Smith’s own work.
 Again, this is an ‘anthropological’ formulation, of the type which informs Adam Smith’s work
Labour MP Tom Harris has written at Huffington Post to tell us what democracy is all about, taking the million-strong 2003 anti-war march (and an article from a Sam Parker* complaining that MPs didn’t do as the million asked) as his starting point:
In recent weeks, I have been contacted by constituents who have asked me to represent their anti-equal marriage views in parliament. I have had to remind them that I am a representative, not a delegate; democracy is as much about being accountable to the electorate for decisions already made as it is about sticking a finger in the air to decide which way the wind is blowing and then to vote accordingly. Had everyone who feels strongly against same sex marriage taken to the streets of the capital last weekend, it’s quite possible they could have numbered more than a million. But supporting the Second Reading of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill would still have been the right thing to do…….
Is not getting your own way really reason enough to disillusion anyone about democracy? For my generation, defeat on issues about which we felt strongly was painful, but we never assumed we had some God-given right to get our own way just because we really, really cared.
Let’s set aside the merits or otherwise of invading Iraq. For me, like Chris, this is an accounting issue on which I don’t have authoritative data (though my rather less concise rendition of this essentially Benthamesque position runs to around 10,000 words).
Instead, let’s focus on Tom Harris’s core assumption about what his role as MP entails. Whether or not he knows it, it is remarkably close to the Burkean view, expressed in his reluctant speech to the electors of Bristol:
Certainly, gentlemen, it ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative to live in the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his constituents. Their wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinion, high respect; their business, unremitted attention. It is his duty to sacrifice his repose, his pleasures, his satisfactions, to theirs; and above all, ever, and in all cases, to prefer their interest to his own. But his unbiassed opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living. These he does not derive from your pleasure; no, nor from the law and the constitution. They are a trust from Providence, for the abuse of which he is deeply answerable. Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.
According to the Burke-Harris conservative theory of representation, then, those who vote for MPs have no God-given right to get our own way, but MPs do have “a trust from Providence” to exercise their “mature judgment”.
Of course, MPs like Tom Harris tend to store up their special powers of judgment for the difficult decisions of state (e.g. whether to kill Iraqis), but are content to rely on the ‘common sense” judgments of the populace, or at least its media proxy, on matter such as the need to get tough on the (erm, non-existent) “second or third generations of families relying on benefits”. This systemic hypocrisy aside, though, Tom’s faith in his own superior faculties is a good reflection of the paradox of modern parliamentary government: that what by objective standards is actually quite a straightforward job, requiring little initiative, has come to be seen as one which requires huge intellect and talent, and which conservatives therefore believe should be ever more greatly rewarded.
But while this paradoxical feature of modern parliamentary government has taken such deep root that it now largely goes unnoticed, it is worth pointing out that it might all have been quite different, at least for Labour MPs, if one event in particular in early Labour party history had turned out little differently.
I refer to the House of Lords’ Osborne judgment of 1909, which declared it unlawful trade unions to levy their members in order to the nascent Labour Party’s organisational and electioneering costs. Writ large behind this judgment was the determination of the Lords to ensure that MPs should remain representatives in the Burkean sense, and not to become the delegates of forces beyond parliament. Indeed, as the Labour scholar Henry Pelling tells us:
Lord Justice Farwell, in another concurring judgment, quoted Burke to the effect that ‘Parliament is not a congress of Ambassadors from different and hostile interests….. but a deliberate Assembly of one nation’ (p.893**).
This, while Pelling (writing in 1982) contends that in the long-run the judgment actually enhanced the position of the Labour party (notably through the introduction of MP salaries as a compensatory measure), it might be argued with the benefit of 30 years more hindsight, that the consequences for Labour, as a party then developing a distinction in its conception of what an MP is in parliament for, were more negative. The proof of this, it might also be argued, is that an ex-SDP MP like Tom can flaunt his quasi-Burkean elitism without even being aware (or being made aware) that there are contesting theories of representation.
Tom is not entirely wrong about Sam Parker. It is wrong to assume that, just because you’re against war, everyone is, and that democracy has been betrayed if you don’t get your way. But the real point here is not that Sam was wrong to protest, it’s that he - and the other million or so - were completely ineffective (as ‘Flying Rodent’ points out very funnily).
And in the end the reason they were (and will continue to be) ineffective is that faced by public pressure, MPs can always now rely on the Burkean defence. As I set out both here and in my (pretty well unread) 10,000 worder on how to be good at being anti-war, the only real way to change that situation is through the labour movement: to challenge what MPs now consider are their inalienable rights to decide for themselves (which almost always leads to them deciding they want what their parliamentary bosses want), and to help them remember that another type of democratic representation, in which they are the delegate of the party, can and will exist.
If it was good enough for the PLP of 1909, it ‘s sure as hell good enough for Tom Harris and his ilk.
* [Update: For Sam Parker, you might as well read Laurie Penny as their take is pretty well the same.]
** I do wonder if this is the first reference to ‘one nation’ politics.
Update 3.30pm 23/01/2013: Miliband’s seemingly statement that he doesn’t want an in/out referendum, this lunchtime at PMQs, merely highlights the need for the tactic advocated here: that whether Labour want it or not, Cameron’s earlier spineless legislation (European Union Act 2011) means that, if any progress is made to develop European treaties as set out below, a referendum is a legal requirement.
So Cameron has promised a in/out referendum on membership of the European Union sometime in 2017. Far from being “a pretty effective trap for Labour” (@philipoltermann), this should open the door for Labour both to confirm victory in the 2014 European elections, the 2015 general election, and then help change the European Union for the better via the in/out referendum. A Labour triple whammy, courtesy of Cameron. Sounds great? Read on……
Let us assume, for a start, that Cameron follows through on the promise to draft referendum legislation before 2015, with a view to its enactment after the general election. This, some pundits will say, is the main trap, because the Tories will be able to challenge Labour to a manifesto commitment on its enactment, claiming victory if it commits, claiming Labour is denying the people a voice if it doesn’t.
This, though, ignores the European Union Act 2011, enacted by Cameron as a panic measure to deflect from his early ”cast-iron” commitment to referendum. While the press have made the Act out to be a safeguard against powers being handed over to Europe without a referendum, section 4 of the Act covers a wide range of European treaty changes which, if agreed at intergovernmental level, will, by law, have to be presented to the British people in a referendum. some of the changes requiring referendum have nothing to do with transfer of powers Yet Cameron has today told us that he supports treaty change before an in/out referendum, in the context of his argument that such an in/out referendum needs to be delayed until the EU has got its house in order:
I agree too with what President Barroso and others have said. At some stage in the next few years the EU will need to agree on Treaty change to make the changes needed for the long term future of the Euro and to entrench the diverse, competitive, democratically accountable Europe that we seek. I believe the best way to do this will be in a new Treaty so I add my voice to those who are already calling for this.
Remarkably then, Cameron may find himself either having to use his veto on what he may consider to be good treaty changes, or being required, through a law made of his own spinelessness, calling a treaty-change referendum before an in/out referendum.
So far, so good. Labour can simply argue that it is compelled by Cameron’s weakness on Europe to enact the draft legislation so as the avoid a farcical situation whereby a treaty-change referendum required under law becomes an in/out referendum by proxy, with a no vote on treaty change meaning a further vote becomes inevitable.
As I’ve set out earlier, a referendum on membership is, in any event, not a bad thing for Labour (on this I agree with Will Straw from IPPR). The tactical battle won via Cameron’s own incompetence, Labour becomes free to engage with European partners post-2015 on the development of a social democratic alternative/revision to the Lisbon Treaty, and to flag up this pre-general election, and pre-2014 Euro elections, in a way which more clearly distinguishes it from the Tories on Europe than it has managed to date. Francois Hollande will still be in office in 2015/6, Merkel may be in a weaker position to negotiate, and Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark and others have a more than 50% chance, I’d say, of having governments with whom Labour can do business on the development of a centre-left treaty to replace/modify Lisbon. It is on the basis of a clearly better-for-the-people Treaty that Labour would then call the in/out referendum.
What would a revised, social democratic Lisbon Treaty look like? Space/time does not permit a full exposition here, but I think six things should be top of the list, reflecting how different a social democratic Europe post-2019 (ie. after the 2019 Euro elections and a leftist majority might look):
1) The treaty should establish the primacy of the European Parliament as decision-making agenda-setting body, with the European Commission removed from its role as one of the three key bodies involved in the current co-decision making process, and developed into a ‘neutral’ civil service operating under democratic command.
This will set Labour and its fellow European parties aside from the Tories, who under Cameron have stated clearly (see PMQs in early January, and repeated again today) that the sole legitimate democratic voice in Europe is the intergovernmental European Council of heads of state, currently presided over by van Rompuy. Labour should argue that the Parliament, as long as it reforms its election system away from the current regional list system towards one where each MEP represents distinct constituency, is now the body with the expertise (and Commission support) and legitimacy that is needed to govern the European Union, albeit with due reference to intergovernmental institutions (not just the European Council but also the strangely similarly named Council of the European Union).
This is not just the right thing to do, as it brings into play the importance of parties working across Europe to establish a majority and then coherent policy within the Parliament; it is also tactically useful, because it allows Labour to go into the 2014 European elections on the basis that the Tories and UKIP are actually just putting up ‘gravy-train’ candidates to be members of an institution they don’t even believe in, while Labour candidates actually want to get some work done.
2) The new treaty should create the legal conditions in which the frankly absurd Stability and Growth Pact and the accompanying ‘six-pack’ directive, are subsequently abolished. These directives are the ones which effectively outlaw Keynesianism by imposing ludicrous constraints on surplus/deficit spending. The treaty should then set out an alternative framework under which member states are required to use their spending power to maintain and enhance levels of social security, employment and income equality. Whether this should include numerical targets and some form of sanction for non-compliance, mirroring the surplus/deficit targets/sanctions set out under a neoliberal EU, is open to debate (currently I would favour such).
3) In keeping with this significant change in emphasis to the EU’s role and the legitimacy of the European Parliament, the new treaty should reverse the decision under Lisbon to remove democratic control of the European Central Bank from the Parliament.
4) The treaty should enhance the existing, but ignored provision in Lisbon, to vary single market conditions on a temporary basis so as to allow for a form of artificial devaluation in countries running behind the EU’s economic leaders in terms of citizen incomes in a way which promotes convergence without the self-defeating austerity measures currently being used for that task. EU structural funds should be used to make this happen.
5) Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy in a way which a) gears subsidy to low wealth producers rather than to richer landowners who are able to use the income-based mechanism to rake in the cash; b) creates both long-term sustainability/reliability of supply, in a time of adverse climate change, and affordability i.e. the CAP should effectively become part of universal welfare provision around decent food.
6) The restatement of the principle of free movement of labour, but with protection from exploitation enhanced by the enactment of something similar to the UK’s Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012, but broadened to encompass existing EU procurement law and to cover multi-nationals.
If the Labour leadership gets its collective head round both the short-term tactics of using Cameron’s own reckless 2011 legislation against him, and then starts setting out its distinctive view of a new social democratic EU shaped by it and its fellow leftist parties, it stands to win the 2014 euros, then the general election against Cameron and then (best of all) a referendum Yes against a Tory party led in 2015 by Gove, or a Gove acolyte, which is campaigning for No vote.
Of course, if Labour doesn’t do that, I guess Philip Oltermann may be right…..
Laurie Penny thinks the SWP’s handling of rape allegations reflects badly on all of us, and that the SWP are only different because they are more open about their misogynist structures:
Other groups are not so brazen as to say that their moral struggles are simply more important than piffling issues of feminism, even if that’s what they really mean, nor to claim that as right-thinking people they and their leaders are above the law. The SWP’s leadership seem to have written it into their rules.
Actually, there’s no “seem” about it. The leadership being above the law is written into the rules of the SWP. That’s what makes it a self-declared Leninist revolutionary socialist party. As SWP head boy Charlie Kimber makes clear in his comments at Harry’s place:
We live in what remains a profoundly sexist society, as is shown by the sex abuse scandals and cover-ups in mainstream institutions such as the BBC and the police. However, the SWP is not an institution of capitalist society but fights for the overthrow of the system. Our party has a proud tradition of fighting for women’s liberation, as is shown, for example, by our consistent campaigning over the decades to defend abortion, and by our criticism of George Galloway for his remarks about the Julian Assange rape accusations. Reflecting this tradition, our internal structures seek to promote women to leading roles and deal rigorously with any action by any member that is harmful or disrespectful of women (my emphasis).
That is to say, the SWP is committed, as a point of founding principle, to not engaging with the criminal justice system, but to handling “harmful or disrespectful” actions through its “internal structures”, which it regards as inherently superior to the legal institutions of the capitalist state. Phil at AVPS makes the point very well:
[T]his crisis was precipitated entirely by the SWP’s own actions, but from the off they were caught in a bind provided by their own revolutionary conceit. If you’re in the business of prosecuting class struggle to the point of the overthrow of capital, and you believe it is your party’s destiny to lead the working class in revolt, as far as behaviour, misconduct and crimes committed by party members are concerned the party is the sovereign body for pronouncing on questions of truth and guilt, of sanction and punishment. Within the terms of party morality and the closed-loop universe of the SWP’s particular form of revolutionary identity politics, they did the right thing investigating the allegations.
To be honest, I’ve never quite got how this works in practice, as there seem to be an awful lot of capitalist institutions that the SWP membership does engage with. Rumour has it that it’s got a large property portfolio, and I’m pretty sure SWP members get around on Virgin Trains and the like. Which institution it’s legitimate to engage with while organising for its downfall does seem a bit selective.
The key point, though, is that the SWP is not falling apart now because it didn’t call in the police; it’s falling apart because the justice system it used instead of the capitalist one apparently proved to be completely useless, in both senses of the term. That is, it apparently wasn’t very well run (I won’t repeat the contended details here) but, even if it had been, the problem would still have remained that, in the event of a guilty verdict, there’d have been no way to mete out appropriate justice; the usual sentence for one of rape is one of imprisonment, but as far as I know the SWP don’t have any prisons.
In other words, the SWP has set out its stall as being a kind of state, operating within and against the capitalist state, but lacks most of the things that go to make up a state.
Now you can argue (as Laurie Penny might if she understood a bit more what does make the SWP different from other groups), that it is the very selectivity about what bits of the capitalist state to opt out of which betrays its misogynist heart - and I do wonder whether the party would have the same courage of its own institutions if the accusation had been, say, child abuse rather than rape. That’s fair enough.
But I also wonder if there’s a wider learning point for the radical left in its anti-capitalist struggle, whether it be via “revolutionary” or “evolutionary” means.
What this sad episode, and the likely fall out shows us clearly enough is that, unless credible institutions which command widespread respect and are therefore seen as legitimate are in place before the borgeous institutions are torn down (or bypassed), then those same bourgeois institutions are likely to return in strengthened form, and with increased popular support. There’s a glimpse of that in Laurie Penny’s own appeal to the sanctity of the law – not something you’d normally associate with her radical leanings – when it’s juxtaposed to the SWP’s own tawdry process.
This is not, of course, a novel insight. We see fine solidaristic principle, followed by failure of legitimacy, and then mutual recrimination and lessened solidarity, everywhere we look. The power of financial capitalism has been strengthened-by-scapegoat since the crisis, because there was no alternative system ready to replace it. The anti-cuts campaigns have failed to date because there is not sufficient legitimacy in an alternative decision-making process to ensure that both elected representatives and officials have both the duty and the backing to deliver an alternative that sticks. People going to job centres are treated poorly because unions have not yet been able to make their calls for solidarity with the workless more legitimate than the managerial directives imposed on staff.
All of which leads me to conclude that, ultimately, the left will only be any use at the grand scale if it gets over the self-imposed distinction (and accompanying hatreds) between revolution and evolution, and accepts that the quiet building of legitimate socialist institutions* in parallel with capitalist institutions, ready to replace them when the time comes, as just as much part of the struggle, and that the devotees of GDH Cole and RH Tawney are just as revolutionary, in their way, as those of Trotsky and Lenin.
*As a quick personal note: I was a member of the SWP briefly in the mid-1980s, taken in by the convincing rhetoric and (to me) new analysis of some very eloquent speakers and writers. I left when I was told that I needed to move my trade union stewardship focus away from the nitty-gritty of supporting workers in their workplace to defend their terms and conditions, defend them at disciplinaries etc.., in favour of more “revolutionary” activity. When the time came to strike, the hospital I worked and organized at had a much bigger turnout than other places supposedly more under SWP inflluence.
Larry Elliot is very good in the Guardian today, as he uses the hook of the supposed increasing employment/flat-lining national output conundrum to set out the real problem:
What appears to have happened is that the rising profit share went to the financial sector and has been used to boost City pay and bonuses rather than used for new investment. In the bracing climate, few groups of workers are able to garner the full fruits of their labour: Premier League footballers are one, investment bankers another.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. The first is that the task of rebalancing the economy may be even more daunting than first thought. If the financial sector is responsible for the entire increase in the profit share over the past three decades, that shows how dependent the economy has become on the City as a source of growth.
Go read it, and the forthcoming paper at Touchstone on which Larry bases his article.
The only problem with Larry’s article is the suggestion that this is groundbreaking analysis. It’s not. Sensible economists have known for about 40 years that under-investment is at the heart of Britain’s economic decline, and that at the heart of this under-investment lies the political hegemony of the City. Here’s David Coates in 1986, talking about Britain’s post-colonial decline:
[O]nce British domination of word trade and industrial production had gone, the interests of the two sections of British capital proved increasingly incompatible, and nationally-based industrialists found themselves locked into increasingly outmoded industries and production methods, whilst at the same time being disadvantaged in their access to long-term credit relative to their competitors, and subject to a political class in which financial interest had a disproportionately strong voice… They found it difficult to persuade bankers to make long-term loans to industry on any scale, or to put up risk capital in sufficient quantities, and hence were driven back into a disproprotionately heavy reliance on their own by now inadequate resources of internal funds to fuel the investment process
Financiers for their part, because of their worldwide interests, lacked any great concern with the successful expansion of the domestic productive base, and instead used their considerable political leverage…to hold successive British governments to policies that were vital to London’s role as an international money market but detrimental to any restructuring of British manufacturing industry (p 207-271).
Larry is absolutely right to say that “the task of rebalancing the economy may be even more daunting than first thought.” At the heart of Labour’s One Nation project should be a courageous re-investment plan, based on a virtuous wage and demand growth circle.
This in turn demands three things: a) deficit spending on infrastructure and renwed public services; b) re-introduction of Trade Unions to the British economy; c) some form of pseudo-corporatist (possibly temporary) non-investment tax, where it costs corporations and banks more to hold surpluses over a certain percentage limit than it does to invest them productively.
I’m not sure Labour’s One Nation thinkers have fully grasped that yet. Unfortunately, there are unpleasant people starting to wait in the wings who do understand how national economies can be kick-started, but who will be keen to make that happen in ways decidedly inimical to the basic tenets of freedom and equality. As Phil at AVPS has rightly noted:
There is probably a populist political space in British politics for a Pim Fortuyn-style formation. A right-wing Islamophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment cloaked in a liberal garb, a dashing of authoritarianism, and Keynesian economics could have wide appeal.
For Pym Fortun, read Michael Gove.
So just by way of establishing my own credibility as a Europe-getting-leftie, here’s what I said back in early 2010:
The issue for here is that a process of technocratic economic management signed into law under the Maastricht treaty, under a particular set of economic conditions which the then policy makers assumed would last for ever, is now adding to an already considerable burden on people who did not make the crisis, and did not gain from the booms that caused it.
As a result there is a real possibility of major social unrest in many European countries, including explosions of racial hatred as workers take it out on themselves; this is the antithesis of what the European Union is supposed to be about.
That, fundamentally, is the stupidity at the heart of the European Union, and reflects the key problem with it.
The European Union is wholly based on the entrenchment of neoliberal norms of which the validity is now widely questioned, but which are set out in permanent form in the Lisbon Treaty and the treaties which preceded it.
Ah, if only the Labour wonkery had listened then, Labour would be in a much better place now; rather than looking opportunistic around the EU budget negotiations, it might look as though we’d thought it all through earlier.
But we are where we are, and David is quite right to follow in my footsteps:
Little thought was given to how the free movement provisions [I assume David means of both capital and people] designed for six countries at similar levels of economic development would work after the EU incorporated the impoverished countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The idea of a social Europe, envisaged by Jacques Delors as a balance to the single market, has been the casualty of a headlong rush towards liberalisation for its own sake.
The reason this is better than some of the other bandwagon stuff is that it’s about the fundamentals of the EU, not about the budget froth, which I’ve already covered in my critique of Will Straw’s IPPR pamphlet. Labour needs to focus on the fundamentals of European reform.
The key question, though, is how Labour can cut through the media fog to present an proper, fundamental alternative which actually gets heard. Vague generalities about the need to build a new social Europe for new times, or whatever, are going to cut no ice with an electorate fed a steady diet of Brussels eurocrats, straight bananas, and French farmers living it large from handouts.
There are two specific areas – both headline-worthy, both off the Tory radar – on which Labour should focus its media firepower. Being wise and all-knowing about Europe, I have already covered both in detail.
First, there’s the obstacle the single market puts in the way of economic convergence between the richer and poorer EU states in a Eurozone situation where currency devaluation is not possible, but where the break-up of the Eurozone would create even more havoc for the poorer states.
As I’ve set out here, the Lisbon Treaty does in fact make provision (Article 32) for the temporary suspension of the single market, and the creation of export subsidy/import substitution mechanisms, such that convergence can occur even within the Eurozone and without recourse to self-defeating ‘structural reform’ of the type imposed on Greece. While that level of detail may not be very headline-drawing, Labour can sell such proposals simply on the basis of its creativity – using stuff that’s already in the Lisbon Treaty – just as the Tories are thinking of doing on free movement of people, but with a mind to the benefit of the whole of Europe, not just as a populist, face-saving anti-migrant measure.
Second, and more headline-attracting than the first, Labour should promise that, on coming to power, it will work with like-minded governments for the abolition of the Stability and Growth Pact six-pack regulations and the parallel Fiscal Compact bundled together in panic by Merkel and Sarkozy in the doomed attempt to save the Merkozy hegemony. As IPPR’s Will Straw said in his reply to my most recent piece on Europe:
As it happens the Six Pack includes provisions for a 0.5% deficit cap which is ludicrous and would effectively outlaw Keynesianism.
In fact, the six-pack regulations already outlaw Keynesianism, as they become European law in December 2011. A campaign Labour for the abolition of these regulations therefore makes economic sense, but it can also be sold on the basis of the sovereignty argument – that the EU should not be telling member states that the only available economic policy open to it is one which embeds neoliberalism.
Taken together, these two initiatives could be game-changes for Labour’s credibility on Europe.
Trust me, I’ve been credible on Europe for ages.
In a new essay for the IPPR’s Juncture, Professor Tim Bale bemoans the demise of the Tory left. That loss, he says, may make the Conservative party unelectable for a long period, given the electorate’s centrist inclinations:
The Conservative party may have dumped Thatcher in 1990 but it did not dump Thatcherism. Indeed, by 1992 it was well on the way to being the almost fully Thatcherite entity it is today……..
Despite the efforts of a few outspoken (and well-resourced) realists like Lord Ashcroft to provide polling evidence for staying on (or at least near) the centre ground, this cannot and will not happen unless there are enough people within the party itself who are willing to make a positive argument for a different kind of Conservatism to that which currently rules the roost. Ideologically, the Tory left would be ideally placed to fulfil that role. Sadly – and possibly fatally for the party’s chances at the next election and beyond – it is nowhere near strong enough to do so.
I think this analysis is profoundly wrong, based as it is on the entirely invalid assumption that the British electorate will always tend to seek the middle ground. It’s as though Professor Bale was unaware of that electorate’s huge swing to the right in the late 1970s, when it came under the influence of a powerful narrative which combined an appeal to personal freedom with a populist authoritarian streak (Stuart Hall’s 1979 The Great Moving Right Show remains the best analysis of this discursive framing).
This time around, though, it could be much worse. I say this particularly because, waiting in the wings for the right opportunity, is Michael Gove, and he is a dangerous, dangerous man. To be blunt, Michael Gove has the hallmarks of a genuine, emergent fascist – the term used in the historical sense rather than the looser pejorative sense used since the second world war.
Whatever we may think of Margaret Thatcher, she was no fascist. Certainly, she had a strong Tory authoritarian/traditionalist streak, and was no stranger to the abuse of state power in furtherance of her aims (e.g. the miners), but she knew there were limits to this; she bowed to pressure, for example, when the New Left took her on over Council budgets, only to make good on her intentions through legislative means in the form of the Local Government Finance Act 1988. Intellectually speaking - though she was no intellectual – her heroes Hayek and Friedman were of the libertarian right, where debate about power and the state tends to be uninformed by real world experience, rather than concerned with how such power is most effectively wielded on behalf of an all-encompassing state.
Michael Gove, on the other hand, looks to be an entirely different beast altogether - one not just operating in far more politically volatile environment than Thatcher, but one who seems more intellectually driven by the radical tenets of fascism than by the traditions of conservatism.
Of course fascism is a contested term, with no single, generally agreed definition. Nevertheless, it has a number of interwoven operational features which help distinguish it both from authoritarian Toryism and from Thatcherism:
- The development of a full-blown ’decadence’ narrative about modern society, the only remedy for which is strong central control of societal behaviour, and the creation of a mythical golden age, in which people led purer, more selfless lives;
- An overt willingness to use the power of the state to enforce, through misinformation if necessary, a particular view of how people should be required to conduct ‘non-decadent’ lives;
- The development of a nationalistic corporatism in which all groups in society are expected to play their centrally ordained parts in the delivery of national objectives.
- An aversion to the uncertainties created by the market, and a willingness to control the economy ‘in the national interest’
- A disdain for liberal democratic norms and conventions, which are seen as a sign of a state’s weakness rather than strength and confidence in itself.
Looking at Gove’s record, even over recent months, it is not hard to detect these tendencies in both policy substance and ministerial style.
First, and most obviously, there is his announcement (column 654) that there will be a single examining board for each GCSE/EBacc subject:
In each subject area, only one exam board will offer the new exams. The independent exams regulator will assess all the exams put forward by awarding bodies. The winner will be the board that offers the most ambitious course, benchmarked to the world’s best, informed by academic expertise and capable of both recognising exceptional performance and allowing the overwhelming majority of students to have their work recognised and graded fairly.
Stephen Twigg’s somewhat limp reply focused on Gove’s disregard for parliamentary procedure by ‘pre-announcing’ the plans to the media – a contempt for democratic convention certainly, but hardly the main point even in these same terms, given that the Education Select Committee have recently warned explicitly against a move to a single exam boards system, on the basis that “the costs, heightened risk and disruption likely to be generated by moving to a single board outweigh the potential benefits”(para. 55). The much bigger issue, though, is that by moving to single exam boards Gove (or his successor when that time comes) will wield much greater state power over what is and is not examined, and therefore taught; the businesses that run the exam boards will have little choice but to comply with, or willingly second-guess, the requirements of the Secretary of State, or risk losing their contract.
Such a process of co-option of business by the state is, as I’ve suggested, the very essence of fascist national corporatism. It’s also worth noting that it’s not just the opposite of what the more traditional Tories on the Education Select Committee recommend, but also runs counter to Hayekian doctrine on how open competition reduces the innately malign power of the state.
Hayek’s seminal ‘Denationalisation of Money’ (free pdf) argues that true economic efficiency will come when the power to issue currency is no longer the preserve of the state, and private organisations compete with each other to be offer the most trusted medium of exchange. Take the word ‘currency’ out of this text, and insert the ‘examination’, and you get precisely the argument that was used by the Select Committee for the continuation of exam board plurality. Gove, however, is having none of this competition stuff in his domain – he has grander priorities than freedom of trade.
As noted, it’s not just the policy, but the style that gives Gove’s true inclination away. Take, for example the new guidance to parents on the content of the revamped Key Stage 2 (end of primary school) literacy assessment. I happen to have seen this because my 10-year-old, a fine creative writer for his age, is unlucky enough to be the guinea pig for it, and risks therefore having his creativity deliberately stunted this year as the emphasis shifts from excellence in writing and comprehension to circling adverbs and putting inverted commas in the right place.
In a show of utterly pointless strength, the department has indicated that the standard of handwriting will form part of the assessment alongside grammar and punctuation. No details have yet been given of precisely what is expected, although the tests will take place just after Easter, but in an an increasingly digital age the idea that it is useful to spend educational resources on ensuring children have a uniform approach to how they write and join up letters can have no reasonable justification. It is being imposed – clearly with difficulty by the department’s experts - as part of Gove’s grand appeal to a halcyon past. It is a small part of the emerging aesthetic of this new fascism – order at the expense of creativity, pseudo-tradition at the expense of societal modernity and freedom of expression.
Then, of course, there are the very deliberate lies.
I have covered in detail, both at Though Cowards Flinch and in the Financial Times, the lengths Gove, and the Department of Education at his behest (along with his willing stooge at Ofsted), have knowingly told lies about standards of educational attainment in England. The important point for our purposes here is not so much the lying – after all, he is not the only minister to have been caught out – but the fact that those lies are, strictly in terms of policy objective, unnecessary.
If Gove simply wanted to improve educational standards, he could seek to do so simply on that the basis that this is, of itself, a good thing to do. If this were not felt sufficient, he could do so on the basis that standards in England have not risen as fast as in some other countries (although the nature of the PISA data he would use does make this debatable).
But Gove wants more than this. He and his acolytes are desperate to paint a picture of a once proud nation in terminal decline – a nation which can only be saved from further humiliation at the hands of foreigners through strong leadership of the type that only he can afford us. In fact, as Chris Cook at the FT has clearly evidenced, exam results have most likely got better because teaching and schools began to get much better around a decade ago (though Cook’s insistence that this was due to Academy status is odd).
But this reality is at odds with the Gove narrative of decline, and inconvenient reality is not going to stand in his way. That is not the way of the fascist.
Gove has all the makings, then, of a genuine full-blown fascist leader. And he’s good at it. In parliament, he plays the demagogue well, and – in stark comparison to Stephen Twigg but also to Cameron and Osborne. His total disdain for the opposition is effected with a solemnity to which Cameron can only aspire. He comes across as a man amongst (over-priveleged) boys; the public recognise and approve of that. It may be painful reading, but the approving comments he garners below the line on the many internet comment pieces about him do reflect a genuine admiration for his strength of vision, and his determination to carry it through, to the extent that the setbacks he does suffer such as the Building Schools Future debacle, come to be seen as obstacles ably overcome – mere details for this man of vision.
What makes Gove so dangerous, though, is the particular confluence of this raw populist talent and the political circumstances in which his star is now rising so fast.
First and foremost, there is the increasing likelihood that the Conservative party led by Cameron will be defeated in the 2015 general election If it is defeated it will be for two main reasons: the failure of austerity economics, a policy cul-de-sac in which it has become inextricably trapped, alongside the increasingly pervasive sense of governmental incompetence, itself stoked by the elitist ‘out of touch’ characteristics of its leading politicians (Gove excluded).
Just as importantly for our analysis, though, is the reason s it will not lose the 2015 election. It will not lose because of its social illiberal policies, or its increasingly hardened approach to the welfare state. These policies are, and will remain, relatively popular – hence Labour’s (short-termist) aping of many of them.
But if the Conservatives lose, they will be immediately leaderless, and immediately directionless. The possibility of a move towards a form of Red Toryism in a bid to outflank Labour’s ‘responsible capitalism’ from the left is no longer realistic, if it ever was, but a continuation of straightforward Thatcherite economic policy will also be impossible, given the abject failure to return the UK to growth. The Conservatives will enter a period of identity crisis greater than that of 1997, and comparable with that of the Edwardian period when, as EHH Green put its in his magisterial study of the period, the party stumbled into tariff reform as its key (electorally disastrous) policy because “it seemed like a good idea at the time”.
Enter Michael Gove: reluctant leader, saviour of the party, prospective saviour of the nation. I don’t expect to see Gove striding down Whitehall in jackboots soon, but the danger that he will – at least metaphorically – is real enough.
As noted, the socially illiberal policies Gove instinctively favours as an emergent fascist will still be popular, but he will look and feel like a man better able to implement them than Ed Miliband, however tough Ed plays it.
Moreover, Gove will be unsullied by association with disastrous economic policy – it is no surprise that he wouldn’t be moved from the education brief – and therefore in a position to develop fascistic state economic intervention as a key policy aim; effectively this may be the development of a quasi- (let us hope) war economy in which, by default, the importance of the national deficit is set to one side in the pursuit of the wider goal of national salvation – we may even see some form of Modern Monetary Theory brought to bear, though it is unlikely to be termed such.
Within the ranks Conservative party itself, Gove will find plenty of willing acolytes to support him in in his reluctant crusade. The intellectually impoverished members of the Free Enterprise Group, for example, have already shown what good fascists they might make, using their Britannia Unchained publication to go beyond the bog-standard Thatcherite supply side solutions to economic stagnation (making it easy to hire and fire etc.), for an initial taste of the coming war against the decadence of the British workers. And the leading light amongst these young fascist wannabees, Liz Truss, has not only been snapped us by Gove for his department, perhaps because she already displays – as her recent ’research’ on childcare affordability shows – a notable ability to tell bare-faced lies for the greater cause. This group, and others within the 2010, will become willing and easy converts to the Gove cause, in the absence of continued Thatcherite leadership within the party.
In such circumstances, it is easy to conceive of a Labour party, which has as yet failed to come up with a genuinely socialist alternative to capitalist crisis management and remains stuck in the (by then) long decade of stagnation, relinquishing power to a suddenly vibrant – but very different – Conservative party led by Gove, in loose alliance with a number of European states experiencing the same trend. Just as the US Republican party in crisis now seeks salvation in ‘tea party’ politics, in its desperation to fall back on the original dream of American frontiership and self-sufficiency, so may European right-wing parties be tempted to fall back on the old certainties of fascistic government; the old saying that, under Mussolini, at least the trains ran on time, still holds some sway in the popular imagination.
The Labour hierarchy and its opinion formers, at least as yet, see nothing of this. Those who care about the rise of extremist politics in Britain seem entirely focused on parties and groupings beyond the current mainstream, unable or unwilling to recognise that effective extremism is much more likely to emanate from within the mainstream, given the current political conditions
They forget too easily, perhaps, that 1930s British fascism emanated, at least in part, from within a directionless Labour party. Labour would do well to heed the warnings of its own history, and set about creating a set of policies and institutions which, come what I hope is victory in 2015, will be enough to keep a new, very different, very dangerous Conservative party at bay. A call for the watering down of capitalism, alongside a Tory-lite attack on our ‘something-for-nothing’ benefits system, is unlikely to be sufficient; Gove can do all that with a lot more panache.
Here’s Carl, defending military invention in Libya, and thereby promoting it in Syria:
Russia, it was said in a recent New York Times editorial, oppose change in Syria, and tried to block change in Libya, on the grounds that “revolutions have completely destabilized the region and cleared the road to power for the Islamists.”
In other words Putin was, and is, willing to see innocent people die for a series of ill-judged guesses about the political trajectory of countries after the Arab Spring. And this is even before we look at Russia’s weaponry client base.
But in Libya it did not happen this way.
Western intervention in Libya is has contributed significantly to regional instability. Life may well be better for a lot of people in Libya (pop. 6m) but in the north of Mali (pop. 16m) life is suddenly a great deal worse. As I set out here and here, the arms-and-mercenaries overspill from the messy end to the Ghadaffi regime was an important factor in the rapid formation of the loose Ansar-Al-Din/Touareg separatist (MLNA) alliance, which swept across the North of the country to take advantage of events in Bamako. The result is that Timbuktu, Gao and other northern towns are now fairly firmly under Islamist Ansar-Al-Din control, with UNESCO heritage sites destroyed as part of that process.
Mauritania to the West of Mali has been dragged in, with thousands of Malians fleeing over the border to seek refuge and the Mauritanian airforce conducting fresh airstrikes against a newly emboldened Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), but with the inevitable civilian deaths resulting.
Now, with seeming inevitability, the informed talk turns towards anti-Jihadist ”Western intervention”, as the Touareg seccessionists (MLNA), presumably deeply regretting their tactical alliance with the Islamist now that they have been driven from their strongholds, reach out for the other obvious source of assistance.
Indeed, the prospect starts to arise – though probably it is still a little way way off – of Touareg mercenary groupings that were once in the pay of Ghadaffi starting to receive covert military assistance to help them fight back against the Islamists, whose hand was strengthened by Western intervention in Libya in the first place and the consequent armed chaos to the South.
It also looks like there is now at least some level of cooperation between Ansar Al-Din/AQIM and Boko Haram, the apparently well resourced Nigerian Islamist group, and if this develops further the potential for wider conflict right across West Africa develops too.
Meanwhile, back in Niger (pop 16m), already terrible food insecurity – drought and locusts both playing their part - is being worsened by the sudden cutting off of remittances from 150,000 or so Nigeriens (again, many armed) who had been in Libya to earn for their families back home, and their forced exit back to a region which already has too many mouths to feed.
All of that looks an awful lot like regional instability to me.
Now, I recognise that some may dispute the precise cause-effect chain I set out briefly here. In particular, there is the claim that Ghadaffi had spent years supporting the Touarg secessionist movement, and that it is therefore invalid to suggest that a movement he supported might have been unleashed, with the knock-ons I suggest, by his downfall.
Nevertheless, I think there’s a strong case to argue that it is Western intervention in Libya which has triggered the collapse of a fragile sort-of–stability in the Sahel region and made it an easier base for Al Qaeida and linked/supportive forces to operate in (especially as AQIM seeks new safe havens after setbacks in southern Algeria). You don’t have to like what Ghadaffi did to acknowledge that he had an interest in using his influence to restrain some of these forces as he tried, until 2011, to cosy up to the West.
So why is Carl apparently happy to overlook this set of unintended consequences in pursuit if his argument that Western intervention in Libya was justified, because of what Libya itself looks like now?
It may simply be that he’s not aware of them, because they’re not headline news in the UK, but I suspect the greater reason is that his humanitarian ‘something-must-be-done’ instincts (which I share, deep down) drive him towards the uncomfortable position of having to set to one side inconvenient facts about what really happens when the West involves itself in wars without a plan to clean up after itself.
In part II of this I’ll be looking further at these humanitarian, act-utilitarian instincts – expressed by Carl but shared by many others, and in particular at whether there’s any potential for rapprochement between this position and the more dominant leftwing position (as expressed by Boffy), namely that intervention by imperial powers is always unjustified because those powers, focussed only on the interests of capitalism, can never take a “moral position”. This won’t be entirely hatchet job on Carl, as I’m also uncomfortable with aspects of Boffy’s logical but uncompromising approach*, and think the answer for the Left lies ultimately in something a bit more nuanced than the one which seems content to ignore the human cost of ideologically pure sidelines-standing.
I’ll probably quote Arendt.
Further reading: an excellent summary and analysis of the current position in Northern Mali and the surrounds by Andrew at Al-Wasat
*A genuine question to Boffy if he’s reading: What does he make of the UN’s military intervention in the East of the Democratic Republic of Congo to stop the advance on Goma of an ICC-indicted warlord? Is that justified/welcome, in spite of the argument that such intervention may only/mostly be being taking place to defend the routes out from the mineral mines which supply the people who end up making our mobile phones?
I have mixed feelings about the new Bomber Command memorial.
I can understand what has motivated the veterans who have campaigned for so long for it: the brooding sense of resentment that they alone have failed to be recognised for their heroism, the need to put the record straight.
But I’m pretty sure that my father, a Lancaster bomb-aimer who bombed Dresden and other German cities at the age of 21, would not approve. I’m pretty sure of that because, until he was killed in 1979, he resolutely declined to talk about the war. He stayed in touch with none of his squadron, attended no memorials. He walked on the hills on Remembrance Day.
My mother, likewise, largely maintained that silence, in quiet respect for the way my father approached post-war life, but she has confirmed well enough what I’d long suspected but wasn’t old enough to ask my father before he died: that he hated everything about the war, most especially what he was ordered to do, and that he felt guilt about what he had done till the day he died.
Of course I accept that other veterans view what they did quite differently and that for them it is a legitimate source of pride.
I accept fully that is easy enough now to see the carpet bombing of German cities (rather than continued attacks on strategic power and transport installations) as a needless act of retribution, but that the decision-makers of the time were subject to pressures, and emotions, that we can only guess at.
For those who flew under these decision-makers’ orders, it is quite understandable that they should have agreed, or come to agree, that what was done needed to be done, and that they should be honoured equally for their part in winning the war against Nazism.
Even so, I can’t help feeling that the memory of my own father is just a little bit sullied by the new memorial: that his way of dealing with the past - family ties and the local solidarity of his workmates in the steelworks to which he returned after the war - has been shoved a little too unthinkingly to one side, in favour of what is actually a very modern politics of recognition.
Fifteen years ago or so, a Labour MP (it might have been Clare Short) was brave enough to suggest that 2014 or 2018 might be a suitable time for the very last Remembrance Day, a hundred years on from the war around which the institution grew up; the brave men we commemorate each 11th November will soon be as distant as the Napoleonic wars were to those same men. Eventually, history must replace remembrance.
Thar MP’s wasn’t a very popular view even then, but I can’t imagine any MP of any colour now calling for a time-limit on remembrance which, if we’re brutally honest about it, may often be more about our need for occasional solidarity and collective emotion by any means available, in a world where day-to-day solidarity can seem hard to come by.
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