John Curtice thought Labour might lose anything between 120 and 220 seats in the May 2016 local elections. In fact, the net loss was 18, principally to Lib Dem and UKIP candidates.
So why was the prediction, based on the extrapolation of local results from the national share, quite a long way out?
I think the main answer is staring us in the face, and it seems odd that no-one appears to have mentioned it yet. I also think it’s good news for supporters of Corbyn.
So this is my take, based on my own local election experience. (But if tl;dr applies – we did well because we had better candidates than we used to).
This morning, I had a really good meeting with two council officers and one of our five new West Lancashire Labour councillors. We were talking about environmental issues in and around her ward (I don’t represent that ward, but was wearing my Resources Innovation Adviser).
She was a delight to have in the meeting. She knows everywhere. She knows all the local groups. She knows lots of council officers already. She knows funding stuff. She knows how to set up a CIC. She gets stuff done.
She joined the party just recently, after Corbyn stood for the leadership. She was selected to stand for council not because she’d done years in the party, but because she’s so bloody good. I’m good at all this stuff. She’s really good.
She’s one of five new Labour councillors around here. Twelve months ago I’d never met any of them.
But they all won, all with increased majorities over their opponents, because they are all well-known people in their area, all social activists in very different ways, but never before active in party politics. They won because they were massively the better candidate in their own ward. One such candidate took a previously safe Tory rural seat- just like I did all those years ago – because she was by miles the best candidate. Voters are not stupid.
They all won selection to be a candidate because they were good, not because they’d done their time or because they were another councillor’s son or daughter.
If I were to ascribe socio-economic class, I’d say three are working class, one is working class become middle class because of doing really well at school, and one is middle class. None of them are parachuted in posh boys/girls, and none are ‘connected’ to the party from previously.
West Lancashire Labour party is now a world away from what it was twelve month ago. It exudes confidence. It excuses competence. But more than anything, it exudes a commitment to social activism which goes way beyond the narrow confines of the council chamber, and ends up cleaning out rivers, chairing housing groups, campaigning for equal pay, representing people at risk Universal Credit sanctions (that’s me, that one).
And it’s the Corbyn revolution that’s made this happen in my area. Not all of them support Corbyn explicitly, but the all joined/stood up to engage in party politics because they understood a year ago that the party was changing, and there were new opportunities to enhance their existing social activism by engaging with the party political process.
Whatever the media says about the Corbynistas being committed Trots, out to take over the party infrastructure is – with the possible exception of one or two big Momentum branches within easy reach of central London – is utter garbage. The real Corbynistas are these people.
This doesn’t mean to say it’s like this everywhere. If it was, we’d have won a lot more seats than we did. In places like Thurrock, where we did badly to UKIP, I suspect the party has not been able to open up to new blood.
But overall, my sense – in line with Corbyn’s instincts and Phil’s commonsense – is that of a party heading in the right direction – opening up to new positive faces and influences, and genuinely moving beyond politics as usual. This trend will continue, and if the NEC and regional HQs can catch up with and then help replicate best practice and best culture from places like Bristol and Exeter, sbsequent local election results will really start to improve overall. More importantly, these local results stand a better chance of then being replicated in the 2020 general election, because voters will identify the link between the new form of local politics and the national leadership which fostered it.
The big downside risk, of course, is that the door may be slammed shut on these new influences by the parts of the party who feel their old power base most threatened – not because they wish the party harm for the most part, but because they are now too blinkered to see the results for what they are – good candidates beating worse candidates in the places those good candidates got to stand.
So no, the results on Thursday weren’t great in themselves, but what they presage might just be, whatever maths the gainsayers do.
Ronnie Corbett, a gentleman of 85 year and reputed for his comedic talents, has died. Lots of other people reputed for their comedic, musical or other artistic talents have also recently died. David Bowie is one. Alan Rickman is another.
So is 2016 a very bleak year for celebrity deaths? Well maybe, but we’d better get used to it.
For what seems to have passed everybody by is that the recent upsurge of celebrity deaths is probably not because lots more people with talent worthy of celebrity status are dying than normal, but that we are moving into an age where people who became celebrities on TV are dying.
Ten, even five years ago, people with these talents dying at much the same rate had displayed those talents in an era before mass entertainment TV, and were already “past it” when mass entertainment TV started in mid-late 1960s.
Now, the people we notice dying in their mid-80s are those who became famous in the 1970s, and who stayed famous since.
As time goes on, people who came to fame in the 1980s will die at the same(ish) rate. This apparent phenomenon of celebrity death is not a weird fluke – it’s TV vs demogrpahics.
The weird thing is that no-one seems to have noticed this demography-mass TV thing, because everyone’s so obsessed with the latest dead celebrity. As the wave increases, if TV coverage of TV death carries on at the current trend, there’ll be no more room on TV for any news other than news generated initially, 40-50 years ago, by TV.
Baudrillard would have a field day. He died in 1999 though, before all this happened, so he can’t be on TV
For many UK observers, Donald Trump defending the size of his penis, in retaliation to Rubio suggesting his small hands might be indicative of a small one, is just another example of how ridiculous the man is.
But there’s another reading, where talking proudly of the size of your dick is actually the logical conclusion to a process fifty years in the making.
This is perfectly captured in William Connolly’s 1995 essay Fundamentalism in America  in which is traced the development in post-industrial, post-traditional American society of what has now become full-blown Trumpism:
The contemporary subject position of the white male blue-collar worker, then, is well-designed to foster a culture of social revenge and hypermasculinity. If boys in this class are indicated into a traditional code of masculine authority and gender responsibility, if they then find it increasingly difficult to get jobs that embody that idea, if liberal rhetoric addresses this ideal in ways that assault that masculinity without opening up viable alternatives to it, then one predicable effect is the emergence of a hypermasculine urban cowboys who drive pickup trucks and listen to Rush Limbaugh.
Using the terms in their traditional valences (in the valences through which many in this subject position receive them), we might say that this constituency is first indicted into a masculine ideal, then feminized through the structure and insecurity of work available to it, then assaulted in its masculinity by representatives of the gender it is supposed to govern and protect, and finally courted by the right-wing elite who idealize the very model of masculine assertion that has been promised and denied.
This co-option by the far right of the disempowered male is not unique to the United States, though it may be most advanced there. I have written previously of how UKIP has successfully tapped into the ‘rage’ of old, white men just like me. For Trump’s dick, read Farage’s fag.
Back then (2014), I suggested that the only realistic way forward for the left in responding to this phenomenon was through the creation of high quality, valued and valuing employment. Two years on, I think that may no longer be enough; what we need, as Connolly suggests above and sets out in his book more broadly, is a wider re-evaluation of how liberal fundamentalism have fed this anger, and how the only long term solution  lies in reinventing what we mean by democracy, and how – through a widen ecology of democratic associations combined with a Habermasian commitment to unfettered discourse.
On that, though, you’ll have to wait for the book.
 The essays is in The Ethos of Pluralization (1995) collection.
 I don’t mean by this that good quality jobs, and a wider process of economic equalization, are unimportant, just that efforts in this areas may no longer be sufficient on their own without an accompanyng process of democratic renewal, to heal the ‘sickness’ that capitalist modernity has brought.
In January I made this formal complaint to the BBC about its inaccurate coverage of one aspect of the Prime Minister’s “renegotiations”.
Your news story about the EU referendum negotiations describes one of the Prime Minister’s “four main aims of renegotiation” in the following way:
Integration: Allowing Britain to opt out from the EU’s founding ambition to forge an “ever closer union” so it will not be drawn into further political integration.
This is an incorrect understanding of what “ever closer union” is about, in the terms set out in the Lisbon Treaty. Article 1 of the Lisbon Treaty states: “This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen.”
That is, “ever closer union” is about union between people, and decidedly not about political greater integration between states. Indeed, article 1 makes it clear that “ever closer union” is about the localisation of political decision making, effectively the opposite of integrated decision making.
In making such an incorrect assumption about the meaning of “ever closer union”, the BBC is effectively displaying bias, as a result of poor research and attention to detail. I suggest the BBC should offer a corrective to its coverage of the “ever closer union” issue, which has been incorrect in this and other coverage.
I have now received this reply, which suggests that, for the BBC, the Prime Minister’s twisting of fact is more valid than actual fact.
Thank you for contacting us about our coverage of the negotiations by the Prime Minister ahead of the forthcoming Referendum on UK membership of the EU.
We appreciate your understanding of the term ‘ever closer union’ as defined by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
However the Prime Minister David Cameron has another understanding of the term. In a recent statement to the House of Commons, he said:
First, we don’t want to have our country bound up in an ever closer political union in Europe.
We are a proud and independent nation – with proud, independent, democratic institutions that have served us well over the centuries.
For us, Europe is about working together to advance our shared prosperity and our shared security.
It is not about being sucked into some kind of European superstate. Not now. Not ever.
Mr Speaker, the draft texts set out in full the special status according to the UK and clearly carves us out of further political integration.
That seems to be the Prime Minister’s understanding of ‘ever closer union’, i.e. further political integration within the EU. While we appreciate that this is not your understanding of the phrase, nor perhaps the official EU line, given the Article in the Treaty of Lisbon, it is nevertheless how the BBC interprets what David Cameron means when he uses the term.
We do appreciate this feedback and your concerns about this issue have been sent to the news online team, and senior BBC management via our daily report, which means they have been seen by the right people.
 For Avoidance of doubt, I did not write the Lisbon Treaty, though the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and The Iliad are indeed both my work.
She shuddered with the evidence that time was not passing, as she had just admitted, but that it was turning in a circle (chapter 17)
I’ve not written on Corbynism for the first 100 days. I missed its early rise so spectacularly that I decided a period of silence, humility and reflection on why I had done so , and more importantly what Corbynism actually is, was warranted.
Here, 100 days on (and 101 days tomorrow) are my first reflections on what Corbynism isn’t, what it is – though Jeremy Corbyn may not well know it – and what promised land it may just offer British socialism.
Or not, depending on whether the British left decides that time has actually passed, or whether it should go in a big 40 year circle of diminishing returns.
What Corbyism isn’t
82 odd days into my 100 days of reflective solitude, and having started to come to some conclusions, I went to listen and perhaps engage with self-proclaimed intellectual activists at the heart of Corbynism.
The event, held at the woolly-left think tank premises of the New Economics Foundation was entitled Corbynism (and what Laclau & Mouffe would tell us about it). It was just awful, both in its organisation and in its content. There was no visible chair to invite and moderate contributions, and the principle contributors simply rambled on about the failures of New Labour and how the rise of Corbyn was a great moment for the British left, on which it should now seize. Laclau & Mouffe were hardly referenced , and the contribution of the one speaker who did try to interpret Corbynism through a Gramscian lens was soon lost in the to and fro between others who had less focus on the subject supposedly at hand.
The way the seminar was conducted meant I couldn’t bear to stay for the last hour but, from what I saw, I got the impression that those with most intellectual clout in analysing the rise of Corbynism, and therefore in steering its course over the next few months, are doing so with the worn out tools of the 1970s and 1980s. They are also using the tools badly.
I’d describe the analysis at the meeting as ‘sub-Gramscian’, stripped off all the finesse that Perry Anderson & Tom Nairn and brought to it in the 1960s and 1970s , and now little more than a vague and in-vain aspiration to a ‘counter-hegemonic electoral coalition of the dispossessed and the partly-dispossessed. Gone, it seems, was any real appreciation that Gramsci was largely writing about the defeat of the left, and of the current hegemonic power over culture and ‘common sense’.
Indeed, such was the reductionism that, ironically, this aspiration to a new electoral coalition did not sound too far removed from the much-maligned Tony Blair’s recent defence of his own – in the electoral and social context of the late 1990s – rather successful coalition building:
Above all, in a society in which fewer and fewer people thought of themselves as traditional working class, we needed to build a new coalition between the aspirant up and coming and the poorest and most disadvantaged.
This was just one awful meeting, but the impression that this where ‘mainstream’ intellectual Corbynism is at the moment is confirmed by other reading .
Doreen Massey’s editorial for Soundings, for example, written shortly after Corbyn’s election as leader, sets out her hopes for what groupings might come together to create a new (counter)-hegemonic force via the enactment of Laclau and Mouffe’s “political tasks” (these being the development of “identifiable commonalities” and “chains of equivalence” such that a common enemy is identified. It’s worth quoting at some length:
There is no doubt that Corbyn’s support draws together many flows. It draws together young and old, long histories and new initiatives. It encompasses elements both of the labour movement and of new social movements. It is definitely not only ‘the young’, as it was initially, rather lazily, labelled. The presence of young people is marked, but so too is the presence of the over-60s (a potentially positive constellation that might help get us beyond the supposed battle between generations). It brings together Generation Rent – priced out of the housing market and let down by the Liberal Democrats over university tuition fees; disillusioned
Labour voters coming back to the fold after years in the Blairite wilderness; and people who marched against the war in Iraq only to feel that it had made no difference.
Then there are those in ‘the squeezed middle’ who see their standard of living dropping year on year whilst that of the wealthy mushrooms; the environmentalists who see the chance to move climate crisis higher up the actual political agenda; the ballooning precariat who are no longer buying the line that it’s their fault; people who see corporations not paying their tax, and the privileges of the 1% swelling, whilst everyone else pays through ‘austerity’. There is a politics here that speaks to people using food banks, pensioners whose pension is not enough to live on, and victims of social cleansing forced to move away from their homes. And there are more constituencies than this, many of them overlapping.
Among these new constituencies there are also connections with some of the most innovative moments in socialist democracy over the past fifty years: the anti-racism, feminism and peace movements from the 1960s onwards; that great experiment in popular democracy, the metropolitan counties of the urban left and the GLC (Greater London Council); and the contemporary wave of experimental activism, from alter-globalisation to Occupy.
That’s a long list. In fact, it’s just about everybody who’s not a capitalist exploiter. And it’s not just long. It’s a list deliberately set in the context of the attempts, a generation or two ago, to do exactly the same thing as is proposed now.
This catch-all aspiration to anti-Tory coalition begs a simple question. How on earth, if the counter-hegemonic project didn’t work back then (except in small New Urban Left pockets, for short periods), will such a counter-hegemonic project work this time around?
The answer is also simple. It won’t.
Pretending that the Corbyn leadership will magically create the kind of social and political solidarities amongst groups of citizens who currently feel not just that they have nothing in common but who now actively oppose the others’ interests – as a result of a hegemony of the right only reinforced by the financial crisis and now a security crisis – is simply wishful thinking.
We live in an age of – to use Anthony Giddens’ term – of deep ‘ontological security’, much deeper than that of 30 years ago. As I explored a little while ago, the question of what’s wrong with our politics can and perhaps should be recast as a (Rieffian) question about what is so wrong with all of us.
In such insecure times, Doreen’s vision of an end to the “retail politics” of New Labour and a switch to a “notion of campaigning to change what the electorate might want, to argue for values, and understandings of the world, that may not be popular now but are what the party (says it) stands for” (p.7), reflects a well-meant but hopelessly outdated concept of false consciousness amongst the masses, which can be overcome through a series of courageous political acts and educational endeavours.
This concept of false consciousness, and the consequent imperative of political education of the masses, may have had some validity before the onset of late ‘capitalist realism’, but from Adorno & Horkheimer onwards both socialists and conservative intellectuals have, and with varying degrees of cultural pessimism, come to the conclusion that realism is either inescapable, and humanly bearable only by an alienation from our true ourselves and submission to capitalism’s material and/or ‘moral’ authority, or escapable only via some form of postmodern ‘lucidity pact’ with the capitalist devil.
I will explore this failure of analysis by the sub-Gramscian Corbynistas more in future blogs (and the book-to-be), particularly on how any attempt to recreate the occasionally successful-in-the-short-term, but overall failed attempt of the 1980s counter-hegemonic strategy for a rainbow coalition of interest and identity groups is doomed to failure in a context, 30 years on, of massive ‘ontological security’ and atomization of the working class.
Suffice to say, for now, that those professing to analyses Corbynism through a Gramsican lens seem to me to be confirming what Gramsci himself had to say about why those on the left who seek to oppose the successful hegemonic strategies of the right by appropriating the right’s techniques, but without the material power to combat the ‘ideological apparatuses’ (to borrow a post-Gramsci term) ranged against them. The occasional unexpected victory (e.g. Corbyn’s leadership win), says Gramsci, has the counter-productive effect of making the left think it can win on the right’s terms:
[T]he social group in question may indeed have its own conception of the world, even if only embryonic; a conception which manifests itself in action, but occasionally and in flashes — when, that is, the group is acting as an organic totality. But this same group has, for reasons of submission and intellectual subordination, adopted a conception which is not its own but is borrowed from another group; and it affirms this conception verbally and believes itself to be following it, because this is the conception which it follows in ‘normal times’ — that is when its conduct is not independent and autonomous, but submissive and subordinate. Hence the reason why philosophy cannot be divorced from politics. And one can show furthermore that the choice and the criticism of a conception of the world is also a political matter (p.23)
In shorter terms: the right won. We lost. The right is much stronger politically and culturally than it was 30 years ago. Combatting it on its own hegemonic terrain will fail, and just make us weaker. The new sub-Gramsci intellectuals of Corbynism need to get real.
What Corbynism is, or at least can be
That’s Corbyn #100. Tomorrow, with Corbyn #101, I move on from the doom and gloom. I think Corbyn, and Corbynism, do constitute a great moment of opportunity for the left – just not the kind of opportunity either Corbyn or most of the Corbynista are currently aware of, mostly because they’ve not read enough books, like what I have. I think the opportunities are much greater than the Gramscians think, but it will take a wholesale revolution in British leftwing thinking (and consequent action) if we are to seize them.
 In my meagre defence, I missed the early rise of the Corbyn factor because I don’t live in an area which felt anything like Corbynmania, which was by and large restricted to London and other ‘metropolitan’ areas.
 My going to London in the first place was inspired by my twitter comrade @RF_McCarthy’s inspired suggestion of waiting to get to the point where someone crassly misinterpreted Chantal Mouffe’s work, then producing her from behind a wall in the manner of Woody Allen producing Marshall McLuhan in Annie Hall. I wrote to Chantal, but for some reason she ignored me.
 Another explicitly Gramscian expression of hope around early Corbynism come from Ken Spours, in his analysis of Osborne’s continuing hegemony
At this point Corbynism could be seen as constituting a ‘primitive political bloc’, designed to mobilise the Left, Greens and a new wave of young people to provide the Labour Party with a sense of vitality and moral and political purpose following a catastrophic defeat. Its primitivism lies in the combination of the enthusiasm and mobilisation for a clear anti-austerity position and the fact that its politics is not yet sufficient to build a comprehensive and effective progressive counter bloc. Moving beyond primitivism involves, among other things, recognising that bloc autonomy can only be momentary and that the real aim should not be independence and the comfort of political identity (although these may have a valid function in 2015), but the more difficult and longer-term exercise of hegemony in the conditions of the 21st century.